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Articles
THE NAME IS THE SAME, BUT THE FACTS
HAVE BEEN CHANGED TO PROTECT THE
ATTORNEYS: STRICKLAND, JUDICIAL
DISCRETION, AND APPELLATE DECISIONMAKING
Gregory J. O’Meara, S.J.*
“In my end is my beginning.” T.S. Eliot1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has changed the law on ineffective assistance of
counsel, and few commentators seem to have noticed.2 In Wiggins v.
Smith3 and Rompilla v. Beard,4 the Court found representation provided
by criminal defense counsel to have been ineffective. Yet, counsel in
both Wiggins and Rompilla did far more than trial counsel in Strickland v.
Washington, where the Court found counsel’s representation to be
effective under the Constitution.5 The Court’s shift in the standard for
Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; B.A. University of
Notre Dame; J.D. University of Wisconsin; LL.M. New York University. The author
expresses his appreciation to Professors Daniel Blinka, Edward Gaffney, J. Patrick Green,
Scott Moss, David Papke, and Shirley Wiegand for their helpful comments. The author is
also grateful for the opportunity to present an earlier version of this paper at the Loyola
Los Angeles Faculty Forum. Thanks also to Danielle Bergner for her careful comments.
Any errors remaining are, of course, my own.
1
T.S. ELIOT, Four Quartets, in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS 129 (1952).
2
Most criminal procedure textbooks either ignore cases after Strickland v. Washington or
treat them as mere glosses on minor points that do not affect the substance of the Strickland
ruling. Compare MARK E. CAMMACK & NORMAN GARLAND, ADVANCED CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL (2d ed., West 2006) (providing an example of authors who
ignore later cases), and PHILLIP E. JOHNSON & MORGAN CLOUD, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE FROM INVESTIGATION TO TRIAL (4th ed., West 2005) (same), with MARC MILLER
& RONALD WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: PROSECUTION AND ADJUDICATION, CASES
STATUTES AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 53 (2d ed., Aspen 2005) (providing an example of
authors who treat the later cases as glosses), and JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS,
2005 SUPPLEMENT TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND PERSPECTIVES 87-91
(2d ed. 2006) (same). See also RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL, 2005 SUPPLEMENT TO CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: CASES PROBLEMS AND EXERCISES 29 (2005) (raising the possibility that the law
has changed by asking, in a note following the edited version of Rompilla: “Did the
majority revise the Strickland analysis sub silentio . . . ?”).
3
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
4
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
5
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668 (1984).
*
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ineffectiveness has remained under the radar because federal statutes
designed to limit habeas appeals prevent courts from announcing new
legal rules in criminal cases that arise in habeas proceedings. Therefore,
the Court has changed the law in a subtle way. This Article explores the
mechanism through which the Court has changed the law in addition to
mapping out what that change is. Specifically, although the Court
continues to claim adherence to the Strickland holding, its later cases
focus on sorts of facts explicitly ignored in the Strickland case, even
though these facts were the bases for the state and federal court decisions
in that case. By changing which facts “count” in ineffective assistance
cases, the Court has quietly changed the law.
Discounting or changing facts is not a practice limited to Supreme
Court Justices. Lawyers, judges, and legal academics operate under a
widely-shared fiction that legal facts are found and fixed solely by jury
determinations or by a judge in a jury’s absence. Thus, legal analysis
draws our attention almost uniformly to the differences among rules or
norms generated by a given case.
The Strickland line of cases
demonstrates that the failure to attend to the density and shading of facts
recounted by appellate courts obfuscates how the law develops and
changes. By ignoring, subordinating, or over-emphasizing facts found
by lower courts, appellate courts change the legal landscape for a given
rule; they change the law. In Part II, this Article introduces the idea of
relevant legal categories: combinations of facts and law that together
constitute the holding of a case. Despite widespread agreement on this
point, legal commentators rarely consider how courts change facts in
arriving at the holding of appellate decisions.6 Part III of this Article
explores judicial discretion and Congress’ attempt to limit that discretion
in habeas proceedings.7 Part IV of this Article considers the work of Paul
Ricoeur, the leading narrative theorist of the past century. Ricoeur
maintained that all non-fiction narratives are constructed entities, and
findings of fact in appellate decisions are nothing more than non-fiction
narratives.8 Therefore, Ricoeur’s observations subvert the received
wisdom that appellate courts adopt the findings of lower courts without
alteration. This Part describes in some detail how authors change
supposedly “fixed” histories of past events.9 Finally, in Part V, this
Article returns to Strickland and its progeny to demonstrate just how the
Court has exercised judicial discretion and changed the law following
6
7
8
9

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
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Strickland by changing the level of density whereby it recounts the facts
in later cases.10 The Article concludes that, for the Supreme Court, facts
found by lower courts are not an end, but a beginning.11
II. LEGAL CATEGORIES EMERGE OUT OF THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN FACTS
AND NORMS
A. Legal Categories: Facts Combined with Legal Norms or Rules
The way lawyers think goes back to Sesame Street; ultimately,
attorneys put people, places, and situations into categories.12 Life, for the
lawyer, is a game of “[o]ne of these things is not like the others.”13 As a
childhood game, such a practice is relatively harmless. Children begin
with simple classifications such as even versus odd numbers, fruits
versus vegetables, animals versus plants. Legal categories are less
clearly defined, and their consequences may be less benign. Who is a
member of a class able to sue? Where do the geographical boundaries of
the United States end, permitting the government to ignore
constitutional guarantees? When does the statute of limitations expire?
The answers to these questions determine a person’s ability to claim
redress in courts and determine when and if the government may be
held accountable for its actions. Categories do not simply separate
zebras from palm trees; they also decide the fate of human beings.
Relevant legal categories are determined by the interplay among
constitutions, statutes, administrative rules, and case precedent on the
one hand, and the facts that ground a particular dispute on the other.14

See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
12
ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2000). “Categories
are ubiquitous and inescapable in the use of mind. Nobody can do without them–not
lawyers or judges . . . .Categories are the badges of our sociopolitical allegiances, the tools
of our mental life, the organizers of our perception.” Id. at 19.
13
Id. at 54-55.
14
See, e.g., AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION 17 (Yadin Kaufmann trans., 1989).
The distinction among the three objects of judicial discretion is blurred.
The difficulty is inherent in the fact that we do not have accurate
instruments for determining what constitutes a fact and what a norm,
and where the border between them lies. Moreover, the judge cannot
decide the facts before he formulates for himself, if only at first glance,
a view of the law, since the number of facts is infinite and he must
focus only on those that are relevant, which is determined by the law.
Yet the judge cannot determine the law before he takes, again if only as
a first impression, a stand regarding the facts, since the number of laws
is great and he must concentrate on the law that applies, which is
10
11
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The interaction of these sources is subtle and nuanced, the precise
working of which is dimly understood at best.15 The French philosopher
Paul Ricoeur describes how difficult the application of legal rules to facts
can be:
The application of a rule is in fact a very complex
operation where the interpretation of the facts and the
interpretation of the norm mutually condition each
other, before ending in the qualification by which it is
said that some allegedly criminal behavior falls under
such and such a norm which is said to have been
violated. If we begin with the interpretation of the facts,
we cannot overemphasize the multitude of ways a set of
interconnected facts can be considered and, let us say,
recounted . . . We never finish untangling the lines of the
personal story of an accused with certainty, and even
reading it in such a way is already oriented by the
presumption that such an interconnectedness places the
case under some rule. To say that a is a case of B is
already to decide that the juridical syllogism holds for
it.16
Indeed, it can be perplexing to determine if disagreement in
appellate decisions arises from a conflict over the meaning of law or
confusion about underlying facts in the case.17 By announcing the
determined by the nature of the facts. There exists, then, an intimate
link between norm and fact.
Id. (citations omitted).
15
PAUL RICOEUR, THE JUST 121 (David Pellauer trans., 2000).
16
Id. Ricoeur held appointments at the University of Strasbourg and the University of
Paris. Most recently, he was the John Nuveen Professor Emeritus at the Divinity School,
the Department of Philosophy, and the Committee on Social Thought at the University of
Chicago until his death in 2005. He is widely considered one of the seminal thinkers of the
twentieth century.
17
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 80-81 (1921) (stating
“Courts have often been led into error in passing upon the validity of a statute, not from
misunderstanding of the law, but from misunderstanding of the facts.”); accord, RICOEUR,
supra note 15, at 123 (stating that “The ‘facts’ in a case, not just their evaluation but their
very description, are the object of multiple legal disputes where, once again, the
interpretation of the norm and that of these facts overlap.”). See also JEROME N. FRANK, IF
MEN WERE ANGELS, SOME ASPECTS OF GOVERNMENT IN A DEMOCRACY 78 (1942). Frank
states:
Even the most conscientious judges, trained in fact finding, often do
not agree with one another about the facts of a case. “In my experience
in the conference room of the Supreme Court of the United States,
which consists of nine judges,” said Mr. Justice Miller, “I have been
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applicable legal categories in its decision, the court designates acts which
are relevant and those which are not in a given situation.18 Moving to
the precedential power of a decided case, perhaps lawyers too easily
claim that all like cases are treated similarly under law. Facts are
slippery things, and changing circumstances can undermine and unseat
the most elegantly-reasoned precedent.19
Although commentators uniformly proclaim that legal categories
emerge out of the interplay of facts and norms, academics usually
confine their analysis to the development of norms alone. For example,
Duncan Kennedy’s brilliant synthesis, A Critique of Adjudication (fin de
siècle),20 focuses solely on the development of legal rules; the word
“facts” does not appear in the index to his book. Similarly, Jurgen
Habermas’ Between Facts and Norms uses the word “facts” in an
idiosyncratic way.
His translator, William Rehg, observes that
Habermas understands the word “facts” as “facticity,”21 the “factual
generation, administration, and enforcement in social institutions” that
lie beneath law, such as the processes whereby governments negotiate
internal differences among various governmental actors.22 Habermas’
focus on the structural limitations of political process differs markedly
from the recounting of historical events in trial courts and appellate
decisions.

surprised to find how readily those judges came to an agreement upon
questions of law, and how often they disagree in regard to questions of
facts.”
Id.
See JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 217-18 (William Rehg trans., 1996). He states:
Because each norm selects only specific features of an individual
case . . . , the . . . [rules for determining how the law is to be followed]
must determine which descriptions of the facts are significant and
exhaustive for interpreting the situation in a disputed case; it must also
determine which of the prima facie valid norms is the appropriate one
once all the significant features of the situation have been apprehended
as fully as possible.
Id.
19
See H.L.A. Hart, Problems in the Philosophy of Law, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY 88, 106 (1983). Hart states, “Rules cannot claim their own instances, and fact
situations do not await the judge neatly labelled with the rule applicable to them. Rules
cannot provide for their own application, and even in the clearest case a human being must
apply them.” Id.
20
DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIÈCLE) (1997).
21
HABERMAS, supra note 18, at xi.
22
Id. at xii.
18
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Legal theorists prefer to explore the generation and development of
norms, which are understood as manipulated and developed as a matter
of course, because facts are seen largely as inert substances, necessary
ingredients that add little to the dynamic process wherein legal
categories are forged. This view of facts could stem from two sorts of
approaches. In the first approach, facts are considered as background or
stage sets. They do not enter into legal reasoning themselves but lie
behind it. Here, facts take on the role of the supporting cast in a play.
They offer human interest, but they are mere stage props; they may
assist the actor, but they are never of central importance. In the second
sort of approach, brute facts dictate what the law must become. Because
they are not subject to change or whim, the law is built around the facts
found in a case; facts cannot be analyzed because they consist of matters
beyond the courts’ control.
A close study of narrative theory
undermines seeing facts in a case as either bit players or insurmountable
forces of nature.
B. Destabilizing Legal Categories:
Events Differ from Legal Facts

Frank, Pound, & Goodhart; Historical

Jerome Frank initially seemed to favor the second approach outlined
previously, because he maintained that facts alone were decisive in
forging legal opinions. Frank largely ignored legal rules or norms
because he thought they had no real claim on ensuing legal decisions.23
Although he conceded that court decisions or even statutes might
contain words labeled as “legal rules,” such rules were merely
summaries of judicial decisions determined by facts. As such, they aid in
predicting future judicial determinations, but this assistance is merely a
prediction of likely outcomes rather than a weight to be factored into
23
ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, A LIBERAL CRITIQUE 152 (1990). Jerome
Frank took over the Securities and Exchange Commission when Justice William O. Douglas
went to the Supreme Court. Id. Frank wrote about law and jurisprudence, though he
never held a formal academic appointment. Id. His position with regard to legal rules is
usually characterized as rule skepticism. Id. There are two varieties of this outlook. Id.
Professor Karl Llewellyn of Columbia Law School exemplified the moderate view. Id.
Andrew Altman characterizes Llewellyn’s moderate brand of rule skepticism as follows:
“[L]egal officials often do not behave in the way called for by the rules inscribed in the
authoritative legal texts.” Id. Law, in Llewellyn’s view, is a more open proposition than
positivists would like us to believe. Id. Although it is sometimes governed by reference to
precedent, law also has recourse to matters beyond the text of the law. Id. “Rules guide,
although they do not control, decision.” Id. By contrast, Frank’s approach was more
radical. Id. at 153. Indeed, Frank challenged the very existence of legal rules insofar as they
affect the behavior of judges or others who were presumably bound by them. Id. Frank
stated that, “[legal rules] were ‘merely words’ that aided in the prediction of decisions but
were incapable of exercising any constraint over them.” Id.
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legal calculation.24 Because he denied operative effect to constitutions,
statutes, and precedent in determining legal categories, Frank asserted
that what courts really do is determine historical facts.25 To explain his
position, he described a hypothetical encounter between a client and her
attorney.26 Ordinary people, perhaps relying upon a model suggested
by medical consultations, assume that an authoritative legal opinion can
be rendered by any attorney who hears the facts of a possible suit
recounted in her office.27 Frank observed that the attorney must be
guarded in assessing the merits of a case, not because the attorney has an
inadequate apprehension of the law, but because she cannot determine
which facts the court will find at trial.28
Frank departs from reliance on “brute facts” as previously described
because he thought that the human sources of the “facts” in a lawsuit
were so beset by psychological distortions that the information they
imparted could not be uncritically trusted:
The actual facts which provoke the litigation do not
themselves walk into court. They do not happen in the
courtroom. When the lawsuit is tried, those facts are
past events. They occurred months or years earlier.
What comes into court is evidence concerning those past
happenings. And what is “evidence”? It consists of the
testimony of witnesses–what the witnesses say about
those past actual occurrences.29
For Frank, legal fact-finding is necessarily flawed because any transfer of
information faces psychological barriers rooted in human frailty. For
this reason, he doubted the assumed correspondence between historical
events and a witness’s testimony in court, stating:
Witnesses are not infallible. They are, often, poor
observers of the events, forgetful or biased recollectors.
They may make mistakes in (1) the way they originally
heard or saw what happened or (2) the way they remember
what they heard or saw, or (3) the way they tell, in the
courtroom, what they remember. That testimony, at
24
25
26
27
28
29

Id. at 153.
FRANK, supra note 17, at 111-12.
Id. at 66-101.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 67-68.
Id. at 68 (italics and footnote omitted).
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each of these three stages, is affected by the individual
experiences, temperaments and characters of witnesses
has often been observed.30
Frank applied a hermeneutic of suspicion to the presumed link between
“what really happened” in history—the event—and what the witness
says occurred. He noted that mistakes in testimony arise from reasons as
nefarious as prejudice and perjury31 and as benign as an “unconscious
partisanship” that emerges from attitudes and psychological motivations
the witness may not fully understand.32
Frank likewise destabilized the presumed connection between
historical events themselves and the facts found in trial court, because
witnesses’ testimony was itself interpreted by finders of fact who were
affected by the same human distortions which infected those testifying.
Specifically, Frank stated:
[T]he judge or the jury must reach a conclusion as to
which witnesses are to be believed. The “facts” of such a
“contested” case consist of that belief of the judge or
jury—consist of their guess as to the actual facts. And
that guess, we repeat, is fallible—because judges and
juries are themselves human beings, and are therefore
fallible witnesses of what the fallible witnesses testify.33
Additionally, Frank described the finders of fact as “second-order
witnesses” who have a distinctively more important role to play than
testifying witnesses, because jurors or the judge determine the version of
facts which will be authoritative and, thus, have legal importance:
A court’s decision turns on the “facts” of the case. But
the “facts,” when there is a clash of testimony, are in
truth nothing but a subjective reaction of the judge or
jury to the testimony, a guess by the judge or jury as to
what actually occurred months or years before the
lawsuit began. For court purposes, the real conduct of
the parties to the lawsuit does not count. All that counts
is the judge’s or jury’s guess as to that conduct.34
30
31
32
33
34

Id. (italics in original).
Id. at 70.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 74-75 (footnote omitted).
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Frank’s prodding compelled other scholars to address the distortions
inherent in factual determinations, particularly the gap noted between
historical events and facts found in court. Notably, both Roscoe Pound,
Dean of Harvard Law School, and Professor Arthur Goodhart of Oxford
left unchallenged Frank’s skepticism in this regard. For example, Pound
observed that, even if facts elicited in a trial court do not match up with
historical events, the law that issues from such situations is
unproblematic, stating:
At common law, the chief reliance for individualizing
the application of law is the power of juries to render
general verdicts, the power to find the facts in such a way
as to compel a result different from that which the legal rule
strictly applied would require. In appearance, there has
been no individualization.
The judgment follows
necessarily and mechanically from the facts upon the
record. But the facts found were found in order to reach the
result and are by no means necessarily the facts of the
particular case.35
Pound’s skepticism is more pronounced than Frank’s. Frank saw factfinders as hampered in the recovery of historical events because of
largely unconscious conditions of human psychology, which rendered
inaccurate both the transmission and reception of information.36 By
contrast, Pound implies a willful motive to shape facts in the record.
Pound indicated that the “facts found were found in order to reach the result
and are by no means necessarily the facts of the particular case.”37 A fair
reading of Pound implies that the fact-finder decides first what the
decision should be and then assembles facts (whether consciously or not)
to compel the result desired. For Pound, findings of facts are plainly
constructed and they need not match historical events in the case at
hand.38 Thus, Pound suggests that legal norms can be based on fictional
events.
In contrast, Professor Goodhart’s answer to the destabilizing moves
noted by Frank and Pound simply ignores the existence of any difficulty.
Rather than address the correspondence between a given historical event
and the facts in the record, Goodhart defined the issue out of existence
by stating:
35
36
37
38

Id. at 85 (italics omitted).
See, e.g., id. at 69-70.
Id. at 85 (italics omitted).
Id.
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If we are bound by the facts as seen by the judge, may
not this enable him deliberately or by inadvertence to
decide a case which was not before him by basing his
decision upon facts stated by him as real and material
but actually non-existent? . . . Can a judge, by making a
mistake give himself authority to decide what is in effect
a hypothetical case? The answer to this interesting
question is that the whole doctrine of precedent is based
on the theory that as a general rule judges do not make
mistakes either of fact or of law. In an exceptional case
a judge may in error base his conclusion on a nonexistent fact, but it is better to suffer this
mistake, . . . than to throw doubt on every precedent on
which our law is based.39
As his explanation makes clear, Goodhart recognized fully the tensions
indicated by both Frank and Pound.40 Goodhart’s quotation above
reveals that he simply removed the issue by fiat, as if to say, “I declare
that these issues are unimportant because, as a matter of law, courts do
not make these mistakes, and if they do make them, we must ignore
them for the greater good.” Goodhart’s failure to address Frank’s
objections leaves the possibility that legal norms can be based on
essentially fictitious constructs.
C. Destabilizing Legal Categories: Strickland v. Washington; Different
Courts Find Different Facts in the Same Case
Contemporary law has not resolved the gap Frank identified
between historical facts and the facts as found by a court; to demonstrate
this thesis, one need only consider how different courts describe the
same historical facts. For example, Justice O’Connor’s opinion in
Strickland v. Washington, when compared with the cases leading up to it
in the lower courts, illustrates how malleable descriptions of the same
event can be.41
To depart from standard practice, it is necessary to ignore the legal
rule and consider simply the facts in Strickland as recounted by the
reviewing courts. The differences between the findings of fact are best
revealed if one focuses on the two interwoven strands of narrative that
Arthur Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 181-82
(1930).
40
Id.
41
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
39

http://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss3/1

O'Meara: The Name is the Same, but the Facts Have Been Changed To Protect

2008]

Changing Law by Changing Facts

697

appear in all the cases. In narrative one (the crime story), the opinions
describe both the underlying offense and the biography of the defendant.
In narrative two (the representation story), the opinions set out the
actions of the defendant’s attorney.
The crime story set out by the Supreme Court is a crisp and tightly
organized paragraph:
During a 10-day period in September 1976, . . . [David
Washington] planned and committed three groups of
crimes, which included three brutal stabbing murders,
torture, kidnaping, severe assaults, attempted murders,
attempted extortion, and theft.
After his two
accomplices
were
arrested,
...
[Washington]
surrendered to police and voluntarily gave a lengthy
statement confessing to the third of the criminal
episodes. The State of Florida indicted . . . [him] for
kidnapping and murder and appointed an experienced
criminal lawyer to represent him.42
After this description of the offenses charged (with no reference to
the defendant’s biography), the Court focused its attention on the
representation story which described the actions of trial counsel, who
was named nowhere in the opinion. Overall, the Court presented
Washington’s attorney as engaged and energetic, yet obstructed by a
recalcitrant client. The narrative began by observing that the lawyer
“actively pursued pretrial motions and discovery.”43
The Court
continued:
[The attorney] cut his efforts short, however, and he
experienced a sense of hopelessness about the case,
when he learned that, against his specific advice, . . .
[Washington] had also confessed to the first two
murders. . . . [Washington] waived his right to a jury
trial, again acting against counsel’s advice, and pleaded
guilty to all charges, including the three capital murder
charges.44
Although counsel advised the defendant of his right to have an advisory
jury on the capital charges, Washington rejected that advice and decided
42
43
44

Id. at 671-72.
Id. at 672.
Id.
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to waive his right to a jury on the matter, leaving sentencing in the hands
of the judge.45
Moreover, in preparation for sentencing, counsel spoke with the
defendant about his background.46
Although he never met
Washington’s wife or mother, counsel did have one phone conference
with them.47 He did not seek other character witnesses to bolster David
Washington’s case, nor did he request a psychiatric examination “since
his conversations with his client gave no indication that . . . [Washington]
had psychological problems.”48 Because of counsel’s own sense of
hopelessness about overcoming the confession to these crimes, counsel
decided not to put on further evidence about Washington’s character
and emotional state.49 Counsel thought it best to rely on the plea
colloquy to draw these matters out rather than on an evidentiary hearing
which would subject Washington to cross-examination; this strategy
likewise prevented the State from putting on psychiatric evidence of its
own.50 Counsel excluded the defendant’s rap sheet and chose not to
request a presentence investigation because such a document would
have shown the defendant’s prior criminal history.51
At sentencing, counsel advised the defendant to own up to his
wrong-doing and take responsibility for his own actions because the
judge liked that approach.52 Counsel argued to the trial court that the
defendant had no history of criminal activity and that his client
committed these offenses under the influence of a statutory mitigating
factor: “extreme mental or emotional disturbance.”53 Counsel said that
the defendant should be spared the death penalty because he had
confessed, offered to testify against a co-defendant, and because he was
fundamentally a good person who had “briefly gone badly wrong in
extremely stressful circumstances.”54 After the prosecution put on
witnesses who described “details of the crimes,”55 the trial court found
that aggravating factors outweighed mitigating factors and sentenced

45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Id.
Id.
Id. at 672-73.
Id. at 673.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 673-74.
Id. at 674.
Id.
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David Washington to death on each of the three counts of murder and to
prison terms for the other crimes.56
The majority decision considered two additional factors bearing on
the attorney’s competence: his failure to investigate the defendant’s
mental condition and his failure to call character witnesses. The
defendant’s mental state emerged as an issue immediately after the
defendant appeared in the trial court.57 Washington was subject to a
mental examination soon after his arraignment by order of the trial
court.58 The Supreme Court opinion does not explicitly identify this
examination as ordered to determine competency, but lower court
decisions indicate this was the case.59 Justice O’Connor found the
defendant’s evidence of mental disturbance unpersuasive, stating:
[A] psychiatric examination of . . . [the defendant] was
conducted by state order soon after . . . [Washington’s]
initial arraignment. That report states that there was no
indication of major mental illness at the time of the
crimes. Moreover, both the reports submitted in the
collateral proceeding state that, although respondent
was “chronically frustrated and depressed because of his
economic dilemma,” he was not under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance. All three
Id. at 675.
Id. at 675-76.
58
Id. at 676.
59
See Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879, 888 (5th Cir. 1982). The Fifth Circuit panel
quotes Doctor Sanford Jacobsen’s report that tracks the standard for competency review:
“It is my opinion that presently the defendant is able to assist counsel in his defense and
understand the nature of the charges against him. It is felt that the defendant possesses
both a rational and factual understanding of the charges.” Id. Jacobsen’s report also
considers the ALI standards for the statutory defense of not guilty by reason of mental
disease or defect: “It is further felt that the defendant at the time of the alleged offense had
the substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law.” Id. It is not clear from the record if this second
determination was ordered by the trial court or if Dr. Jacobsen acted sua sponte in giving
his opinion on the matter. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft
1962), providing:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms “mental disease or defect” do not
include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or
otherwise anti-social conduct.
Id.
56
57
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reports thus directly undermine the contention made at
the sentencing hearing that respondent was suffering
from extreme mental or emotional disturbance during
his crime spree.60
The Court relied on this fact to counter criticism that the defense
attorney failed to hire his own psychiatric or psychological expert.61
Furthermore,
Justice
O’Connor
observed,
“the
aggravating
circumstances were so overwhelming that no substantial prejudice
resulted from the absence at sentencing of the psychiatric evidence
offered in the collateral attack.”62
Second, fourteen persons later submitted affidavits attesting to the
defendant’s good character, his financial worries, and that the acts
charged were not representative of the sort of person he was, which
could be used as part of a mitigation argument.63 Justice O’Connor also
rejected this evidence as either cumulative or flawed.64 The defendant
testified “along those lines at the plea colloquy.”65 Justice O’Connor
continued, “[m]oreover, respondent’s admission [during the plea
colloquy] of a course of stealing rebutted many of the factual allegations
[claiming the defendant had no prior record] in the affidavits.”66
In light of these facts recounted by the Court, the explanation for
David Washington’s death sentence seems clear. The crime story
narrative strand portrays an ordinary and hopeless case which Clarence
Darrow could not have rescued. The representation narrative strand
depicts a hard-working defense attorney facing overwhelming odds and
an uncooperative defendant. Although the experienced attorney made
strong efforts, he could not undo the missteps David Washington had
made. The defendant is portrayed as a generic client with no remarkable
biography who had a felony record and could not be expected to act
differently. In large measure, the death warrant was signed and sealed
before David Washington entered the courtroom.
Justice O’Connor observes that “[t]here are no conflicts between the
state and federal courts over findings of fact[;]”67 however, the more
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 676-77.
Id.
Id. at 677.
Id. at 675, 677.
Id. at 677.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 698.
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detailed facts recounted in the crime story by the lower courts contrast
vividly with the brief and monochromatic recitation of the Strickland
majority. Initially, the murders at issue are extraordinarily bloody and
sexually coded, described by the government as “three (3) of the most
brutal murders in Florida’s history.”68 The description offered by the
Supreme Court of Florida bears out that characterization:
These appeals arise out of a series of murders committed
by appellant during a twelve-day period. On September
20, 1976, appellant and an accomplice formulated a plan
to rob and kill Daniel Pridgen. The purported motive
for the killing was the fact that Pridgen, a minister, was a
homosexual and in appellant’s opinion a man of the
cloth violated religious and moral precepts by engaging
in homosexual activities.
According to the plan,
appellant’s accomplice was to induce Pridgen to engage
in homosexual activities. When Pridgen was undressed
and in bed, the accomplice was to cough two times as a
sign for appellant to enter the home and kill
Pridgen. . . . [W]hile the accomplice covered Pridgen’s
face with a pillow and held him helpless, appellant
stabbed the victim to death.69
During the evening of September 23, 1976, appellant
proceeded to the residence of Katrina Birk pursuant to a
plan for robbery. Mr. Birk allegedly had previously
acted as a “fence” for property stolen by
appellant. . . . Appellant waited until he was relatively
certain that the occupants of the home, Mrs. Birk and her
three
sisters-in-law,
were
together
in
one
room. . . . Appellant instructed the four occupants to lie
on the floor. Two of the women complied with
appellant’s demand, and appellant permitted one
woman to seat herself in a chair. Mrs. Birk went into the
kitchen and obtained a box containing money, which she
offered to appellant. [Appellant then tied up the four
women.] . . . As appellant was completing this task, he
observed Mrs. Birk inching her way into the kitchen. An
argument ensued between the two, and appellant shot
68
Brief for Petitioner at 5, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (No. 82-1554), in
146 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 218
(Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1985).
69
Washington v. Florida, 362 So. 2d 658, 660 (Fla. 1978).
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Mrs. Birk in the head and repeatedly stabbed her with
his knife, causing her death. Appellant thereafter
approached his bound victims, shooting each in the
head and inflicting several stab wounds. . . . Each of the
sisters-in-law survived the assault.
However, one
woman became blind in one eye, one suffers breathing
difficulties due to the knife wounds to her lungs, and
one remains in a comatose, vegetable state.70
On approximately September 27, 1976, appellant
contacted his third victim, Frank Meli, [to arrange a testdrive and purchase of a car Meli had advertised in the
local paper.] . . . Following the test drive, appellant
persuaded Meli to go to appellant’s home to obtain the
money to conclude the sale. Upon Meli’s entry into
appellant’s home, appellant brandished a knife and
forcibly bound his victim to a bed. Two of appellant’s
companions assisted appellant in guarding Meli to
prevent an escape. Appellant succeeded in selling
Meli’s automobile and then forced Meli to telephone his
family and request a ransom.
On the morning of September 29, 1976, appellant paid
his companions part of the proceeds from the sale of the
automobile for their assistance in holding Meli captive.
Appellant’s friends left the residence and appellant
entered the bedroom where Meli had been tied spreadeagled to a bed. The testimony at this point is
conflicting. Appellant stated in his subsequent written
confession to police that Meli had untied one of the four
straps securing him to a bed and a struggle ensued. It is
uncontested, however, that appellant stabbed Meli
eleven times.
During the stabbing, appellant’s
companion entered the bedroom and covered Meli’s face
with a pillow to prevent others from hearing the victim’s
screams. When appellant and his companion left the
room a few minutes later, Meli was fatally wounded but
still alive. Before leaving, appellant secured Meli’s
bonds and gagged him.
[After unsuccessfully
attempting to secure the ransom payment, Washington
Id. at 660-61; see also Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1247 n.1 (5th Cir. 1982)
(noting that the comatose victim later died).

70

http://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss3/1

O'Meara: The Name is the Same, but the Facts Have Been Changed To Protect

2008]

Changing Law by Changing Facts

703

returned home and found Meli dead.] . . . Appellant then
dug a shallow grave in his backyard and buried his
victim’s body.71
The gruesomeness of these offenses, which occurred in a ten-day period
by someone having no history of violent behavior, subverts the flat
assertion that the defendant had no serious psychiatric or psychological
disturbance at the time of the crimes.
There is an initial similarity between Justice O’Connor’s observations
of the early stages of defense counsel’s representation and the findings in
the lower courts. Lower courts describe attorney William Tunkey as
“eminently qualified and experienced,” although there is nothing in the
record to indicate that he had ever handled a murder case.72 Courts note
Tunkey’s original “lengthy interviews” with his client and his beginning
pre-trial discovery and preparation of pre-trial motions.73 After learning
that Washington had confessed not only to the Meli case but also to two
prior murders, Tunkey testified he was “shocked” and “overcome with a
‘hopeless’ feeling”74 and did “very little” in the weeks preceding the
sentencing hearing.75 He made no attempt to meet Washington’s mother
and wife after they had failed to keep one appointment.76
Where lower courts differ markedly from the Supreme Court is in
their evaluation of Tunkey’s failure to investigate. Tunkey claimed
“minimal” attempts to contact other prospective witnesses to testify on
Washington’s behalf; nothing in the record indicates that he contacted
anyone in this regard.77 The district court found “that this failure to
investigate constituted an ‘error in judgment.’”78 There is conflicting
Washington, 362 So. 2d at 661.
Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1284 n.16 (Johnson and Anderson, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Judge Johnson stated that:
In the case of Mr. Tunkey, the record makes clear that, as a criminal
attorney, he is eminently qualified and experienced. In this particular
case, however, the district court notes that he was simply
overwhelmed by the unique circumstances of his client’s decision to
plead guilty. . . . The issue before this Court is not the competence of
Mr Tunkey; it is only whether on this particular occasion counsel was
effective.
Id. (citations omitted).
73
Strickland, 673 F.2d at 886.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1281 (Johnson and Anderson, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Although the majority opinion found that such error did not constitute
71
72
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evidence in the record describing Tunkey’s failure to request a
psychiatric evaluation for a man whose actions Tunkey described as
“inexplicable” given his impression of Washington as a “person who
expressed very capably human emotions, who express[ed] grave
concerns about the welfare of his family, of his wife, of his child.”79
Originally, Tunkey testified that he did not think psychiatric testimony
would be helpful in explaining Washington’s behavior.80 Later, Tunkey
stated under oath: “I did not think at the time to go ahead and utilize
psychiatric or psychological experts to somehow demonstrate the
overriding nature of the mitigating circumstances, I did not think of
that.”81 Rather than obtain psychiatric testimony to establish claimed
statutory mitigating circumstance of “extreme mental or emotional
disturbance,” Tunkey testified that the defendant’s own testimony at the
guilty plea colloquy adequately covered this issue.82 This explanation is
undercut by the trial record wherein the court denied Washington’s
attempt to explain his behavior at the guilty plea. The court stated it
would consider that issue only at sentencing.83 Despite the court’s
explicit invitation to do so, Tunkey introduced no mitigating evidence at
sentencing.84 Again, the record undermines the later claim that this
choice was “strategic.”85
The lower court opinions further subvert every claim that Tunkey
made “tactical choices[;]” rather, they find repeated instances of
incompetence. It is not clear that Tunkey even read the court-ordered
psychiatric examination of the defendant on file in the case. During the
habeas proceeding, Tunkey testified that he could not recall if he had seen
the report at the time of the sentencing hearing.86 This failure is
underscored by the wealth of support Tunkey could have found for
mitigation with comparatively little effort. Two later affidavits from
psychiatrists indicate that David Washington came from a “broken and
violent home, one marked by extensive child abuse and incest.”87 They
note his “panic, frustration, and depression at his economic

ineffective assistance of counsel, Judges Johnson and Anderson declined to agree with this
conclusion. See id. at 1281 n.4.
79
Strickland, 673 F.2d at 886.
80
Id. at 887.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1266 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
84
Id.
85
Id. at 1284 n.17.
86
Strickland, 673 F.2d at 888-89.
87
Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1266.
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circumstances; and his remorse for his crimes.”88 A later psychiatric
report finds that Washington did meet the statutory defense of being
“under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance or that
he was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of law” at the
time of these offenses.89 This report further revealed that Washington
reported a previous homosexual incident with Pridgen, the first murder
victim.90
According to the lower courts, Tunkey’s failure to exert himself on
his client’s behalf continued through the sentencing hearing.91 At the
hearing, Tunkey waived his opening statement, relying instead on his
sentencing memorandum.92 The state produced “nine witnesses who
testified about the aggravated nature of the offenses.”93 It also
introduced fifteen exhibits detailing the gruesome crimes.94 Tunkey
offered no testimony or evidence at the sentencing hearing; rather, he
relied solely on the statement of the defendant during the guilty plea
colloquy which the trial court cut short. Tunkey’s argument at the close
of the hearing “covers only three transcript pages.”95 Tunkey later
testified he made the tactical choice to avoid placing David Washington
on the stand to avoid cross examination during sentencing for fear his
record would be revealed.96 This “tactical choice” is undermined by the
record which shows that Washington admitted his prior offenses in the
guilty plea colloquy weeks before, as Justice O’Connor noted in her
opinion.97 Tunkey’s claim that there was a “benefit” to keeping his client
off the stand was illusory. The district court’s order further noted that
Tunkey “couldn’t say that [his failure to request a presentence

Id.
Strickland, 673 F.2d at 890.
90
Id. at 891. The court discounted this later report because it was based on statements
“only recently made by Washington” and claimed that “a similar evaluation conducted in
1976 would not have revealed this information.” Id. The basis for this conclusion is
unclear. Id.
91
See Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1265.
92
Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1265 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
93
Id. at 1265.
94
Id.
95
Brief for Respondent at 9, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (No. 82-1554),
in 146 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
436 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1985).
96
Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1265 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
97
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 677 (1984). The Court stated that,
“[m]oreover, respondent’s admission [during the guilty plea colloquy] of a course of
stealing rebutted many of the factual allegations in the affidavits [describing him as lawabiding and as having a good character].” Id.
88
89
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investigation] was a trial strategy.”98 Thus, the district court found
Tunkey’s testimony that a presentence investigation could be more
“detrimental than helpful,” to be unsupported by the record.99
Tunkey’s failures in representation are highlighted by the lower
courts’ specific findings of fact regarding both the crime itself and the
defendant’s biography. In contrast to Justice O’Connor’s minimalist
draft of the crime narrative, lower-court opinions describe in detail both
the defendant’s horrendous childhood and his excessively bloody
offenses. Washington came from a home marked by violence, abuse,
and incest. His murders were extraordinarily grisly and sexual. All
involve stabbings or shootings at point blank range that would have
covered the defendant in copious amounts of blood. Two stabbings
occur while the victims are in bed. In the first, Pridgen is presumably
unclothed. In the third killing, the defendant stabs Melli (who is bound
to the bed and gagged throughout) so that Melli bleeds to death on the
defendant’s own mattress. The defendant engages in this behavior in the
course of ten days with no previous indication of sexually violent
tendencies. By covering over these facts, Justice O’Connor’s decision
obscures evidence of Washington’s psychological disturbance that the
lower courts thought relevant to their holding that Tunkey’s
representation was constitutionally defective.
The lower courts found that Tunkey did almost nothing by way of
preparation for “three (3) of the most brutal murders in Florida’s
history.”100 What emerges from these facts is an attorney of meager
imagination, who lacked rudimentary knowledge of psychology, and
who did little by way of actually defending a young man who appeared
mentally or emotionally impaired.
III. JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND AEDPA, AN ATTEMPT TO LIMIT JUDICIAL
DISCRETION
A. Judicial Discretion
If one case engenders such divergent recountings of the same facts, if
a gap exists between “historical events” and facts laid out by different
reviewing courts, then the drafting of facts in these cases, and I submit in
all cases, must be recognized as a locus for the exercise of judicial
98
Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1282 (Johnson and Anderson, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
99
Id. (footnote omitted).
100
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 68, at 5.
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discretion. Judicial discretion occurs whenever a court has the authority
to choose between at least two permissible alternatives.101 Professor
Aharon Barak of Hebrew University notes that a judge exercising her
discretion “will not act mechanically, but will weigh, reflect, gain
impressions, test, and study.”102 He describes the process of applying
norms to particular fact situations as more a matter of art than of logical
deduction; there are necessary gaps in the law wherein a court must act,
stating:
[I]t is as though the law were saying, “I have determined
the contents of the legal norm up to this point. From
here on, it is for you, the judge, to determine the
contents of the legal norm, for I, the legal system, am not
able to tell you which solution to choose.” It is as
though the path of the law came to a junction, and the
judge must decide–with no clear and precise standard to
guide him–which road to take.103
Professor Barak identifies three objects of possible judicial discretion:
determining the facts, application of a norm previously determined, and
determining a new norm.104
In criminal law, the exercise of discretion is seen as a mixed blessing.
Professor Frank Remington saw discretion as necessary in the criminal
justice system because the problems addressed are complex and multifaceted, and actors in the system need to employ “varied, individualized
responses” to make the criminal justice system work.105 Remington
noted further that, although research supports the wise use of discretion
at different places in the criminal justice system, much decision-making
in the criminal sphere now rests more on ideological reaction than social
science.106
Thus, Professor Michael Tonry observes that “official
BARAK, supra note 8, at 7.
Id. (footnote omitted).
103
Id. at 8.
104
Id. at 12-16.
105
Frank J. Remington, The Decision to Charge, The Decision to Convict on a Plea of Guilty,
and the Impact of Sentence Structure on Prosecution Practices, in DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: THE TENSION BETWEEN INDIVIDUALIZATION AND UNIFORMITY (Lloyd E. Ohlin &
Frank J. Remington eds., 1993).
106
Id.; accord, DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 13 (2001). He stated:
In another significant break with past practice, crime policy has ceased
to be a bipartisan matter that can be devolved to professional experts
and has become a prominent issue in electoral competition. A highly
charged political discourse now surrounds all crime control issues, so
101
102
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discretion is widely distrusted–from the right, from concern for the
chimera of ‘undue leniency’; from the left, from concern that discretion
will be exercised invidiously or capriciously.”107 Attacks on discretion
are found at every level of the criminal justice system. For instance,
Professor Lloyd Ohlin observes:
It should not be assumed that the attack on the
allocation and use of discretion is confined to sentencing
decisions alone. Parole boards are being eliminated or
their discretion curtailed by legislated mandatory
sentences or judicial use of split sentence provisions in
which part of the sentence must be served in
confinement and part under community supervision.
Attempts have also been made to limit the freedom of
prosecutors to engage in charge or plea bargaining.108
Similarly, Professor Samuel Walker maintains that, almost uniformly, the
present goal of the criminal justice system seems to be to control
discretion, or at least challenge it wherever it occurs.109
Although there is some disagreement on this point, legal theorists
maintain that discretion shifts its locus of operation, rather than
disappears, when it is subject to controls. Professor Remington notes
that efforts to limit discretion in one area do not eliminate discretion;
they merely shift it to another process or player in the system.110 For
example, Remington’s research demonstrates that “efforts to limit
discretion at other stages, such as sentencing, have greatly increased the

that every decision is taken in the glare of publicity and political
contention and every mistake becomes a scandal. . . . Policy measures
are constructed in ways that appear to value political advantage and
public opinion over the views of experts and the evidence of
research. . . .
There is now a distinctly populist current in penal politics that
denigrates expert and professional elites and claims the authority of
‘the people’, of common sense, of ‘getting back to basics’. The
dominant voice of crime policy is no longer the expert or even the
practitioner but that of the long-suffering, ill-served people–especially
of ‘the victim’ and the fearful, anxious members of the public.
Id.
Michael Tonry, Foreword, in DISCRETION, supra note 105, at xiv.
Lloyd E. Ohlin, Surveying Discretion by Criminal Justice Decision Makers, in DISCRETION,
supra note 103, at 3.
109
SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 1950-1990 (1993).
110
DISCRETION, supra note 105, at 99.
107
108
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power of the prosecutor and the importance of the charging decision.”111
For Remington, discretion never disappears; it simply moves. Professor
Walker disagrees and believes that discretion is not necessarily
“displaced upstream or downstream.”112 Still, Walker admits that the
weight of research indicates that the shifting of discretion does occur.113
B. AEDPA: An Attempt to Limit Judicial Discretion
Cases dealing with ineffective assistance of counsel following
Strickland are often constrained by legislation designed to limit habeas
proceedings. If the case arises under anything but a direct appeal from
the federal district court, it reaches federal review through the
mechanism of a habeas claim which determines if a prisoner is held in
violation of the United States Constitution. The Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) restricts the ability of
federal courts to announce new law in habeas cases.114 Senator Hatch
claimed the bill was attempting to “reform[]” federal habeas corpus in
such a way as to lessen “frivolous appeals.”115 This provision was also
seen as reducing the perceived welter of state convictions overturned by
habeas proceedings.116 Section 2254(d) limits habeas review solely to
lower-court decisions that are (1) “an unreasonable application of[]
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court”
and (2) to decisions “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”117 The
Id.
WALKER, supra note 109, at 150. Although Walker admits that some shifting will
occur, he believes that such displacement does not interfere with efforts to control
discretion. Id.
113
Id.
114
28 U.S.C § 2254(d) (2000). The statute provides as follows:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim–
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
Id.
115
141 CONG. REC. S7479 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch); Larry W.
Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381, 398, n.52 (1996).
116
See, e.g., Note, Rewriting the Great Writ: Standards of Review for Habeas Corpus Under the
New 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1868, 1876-77 (1997).
117
28 U.S.C § 2254(d)(2).
111
112
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statute circumscribes the ability to apply later precedent to state
convictions retroactively because new decisions are not “clearly
established Federal law” at the time of the state conviction.118
Since the legislation took effect, access to habeas relief has been
further narrowed by Supreme Court cases that tighten the
understanding of the phrase “clearly established Federal law.”119 The
Court defines “clearly established Federal law” as “the holdings . . . of
. . . [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant statecourt decision.”120 Although there is some disagreement, even within
the Court, about how the phrase “‘clearly established’ at the time”
should be parsed,121 none of the Justices disagree with the idea that this
added requirement was intended to further restrict access to reviewing
courts. Generally, courts indicate that habeas courts cannot expand the
law beyond published decisions of the Supreme Court.
Thus, federal courts affected by AEDPA are denied the usual way of
proceeding in legal cases marked by the interplay between facts and law.
Justice Scalia has observed that the law cannot change in this situation.122
The reviewing court (including the Supreme Court) must apply the law
as it has been previously determined by the Supreme Court.123 If change
in law cannot be countenanced by a reviewing court, it seems that
AEDPA places all habeas review in a structural position that bears strong
resemblance to the role of courts described by Jerome Frank.124 The law
is held constant, and it cannot change; all that matters is how lower
courts apply settled law to the facts presented. The facts, of course, can
and do change, but the assumption underlying section 2254(d) is that
facts do not and cannot change the law.
A model helps explain how settled law operates under this view of
section 2254(d). Imagine a stainless steel delivery system. Facts are fed
into the shiny legal apparatus which routes them (perhaps by means of
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id.
120
Id.
121
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 543 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia defines
the legal requirement as limiting precedent that can be cited to that which is “‘clearly
established’ at the time of the [lower court] decision.” Id. By contrast, Justice O’Connor
maintains in the majority opinion that it is sufficient that the prior case merely be before the
Court on habeas review. Id. at 522. “Contrary to the dissent’s contention, . . . we therefore
made no new law in resolving Williams’ ineffectiveness claim.” Id.
122
Id. at 543.
123
See Williams, 529 U.S at 412.
124
See supra notes 23-34 and accompanying text (describing Professor Frank’s position on
the role of courts).
118
119
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pneumatic tubes) through the already-established legal calculus and
deposits them into two groups. In group one, relief can be granted. In
group two, no relief can be granted. The law itself has an impenetrable
and impermeable quality. The legal norms adopted in earlier cases
determine which facts matter and which do not. These norms are
unvarying and relatively easily identified; therefore, courts can apply
these rules to facts presented without ambiguity.
Adoption of the model presented above should cause federal courts
to dispose of habeas cases quickly. The provision would give finality to
lower-court judgments; it would limit unwarranted expansion of the
law, and it would severely restrict the grounds for any reviewing court’s
decision. Similar factual situations would necessarily result in similar
dispositions. To see if the law works as proposed, it is fair to ask: Is
judicial discretion curtailed by limiting the legal norms that are applied
or do courts circumvent this restriction?
Any enunciated legal rule is vague in the absence of a factual basis
that thickens its description and provides a context for comparison.
Without the context of the crime and representation narratives described
above, the rule announced in Strickland is unclear. Once the underlying
facts are taken into account, legal interpretation acts as a dynamic
process and norms and facts “condition” each other as noted by Paul
Ricouer, who posits:
[T]he interpretation of the facts and the interpretation of
the norm mutually condition each other[]. . . . If we
begin with the interpretation of the facts, we cannot
overemphasize the multitude of ways a set of
interconnected facts can be considered and, let us say,
recounted. . . . We never finish untangling the lines of
the personal story of an accused with certainty, and even
reading it in such a way is already oriented by the
presumption that such an interconnectedness places the
case under some rule. To say that a is a case of B is
already to decide that the juridical syllogism holds for
it.125
Thus, the facts in the decision define the reach of the holding and permit
the lawyer to make educated guesses concerning into which category
ensuing cases will fall.
125

RICOEUR, supra note 15, at 121.
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IV. PAUL RICOEUR AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF NON-FICTION NARRATIVES
To analyze narrative, one must consider the work of philosopher
Paul Ricoeur, whose ground-breaking study of non-fiction narratives
provides a tool for understanding judicial discretion in the construction
of facts.126 Ricoeur’s explanation of non-fiction writing explains how
courts can uphold section 2254 and still exercise discretion by: (1)
selecting facts considered relevant; (2) adjusting the scale of abstraction
when describing historical events; and, (3) retrieving actors and events
from the refuse heap of the immaterial and casting their role as crucial to
the narrative. In short, by changing the description of facts, courts
change the law significantly.
A. Language Limits How Written Texts Are Understood
Although Ricoeur never wrote a systematic jurisprudence, his work
provides a foundation for lawyers wrestling with historical description
and limitations imposed by any use of language. Ricoeur sees the
rendering of non-fiction narratives as a complicated, multi-layered, and
constructive process that undermines any naive apprehension that it is
possible to record the past unproblematically. He maintains that there
are a “multitude of ways a set of interconnected facts can be considered
and . . . recounted.”127 This understanding shuns the idea that the facts
in a case are simply “given.”128 After describing aspects of language that
underlie any discussion of how texts convey meaning, I will turn to
Ricoeur’s work that specifically addresses the writing of history. His
description of how non-fiction narratives are written explains what
judges do when they draft facts in appellate decisions. I will then apply
the categories developed by Ricoeur to show how the law has changed in
cases dealing with ineffective assistance of counsel.
Initially, gaps arise between historical events and facts later found by
a court because understanding a text is as much a matter of “who is the
reader?” as it is a matter of “what is written down?” Social sciences have

126
See, e.g, PAUL RICOEUR, TIME AND NARRATIVE, vol. 3 99-274 (K. Blamey & D. Pellauer
trans., 1985) [hereinafter RICOEUR, TIME]; PAUL RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN
SCIENCES, ESSAYS ON LANGUAGE, ACTION, AND INTERPRETATION (John B. Thomson trans. &
ed., 1981) [hereinafter RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS]; PAUL RICOEUR, MEMORY, HISTORY,
FORGETTING 133-411 (K. Blamey & D. Pellauer trans., 2004) [hereinafter RICOEUR, MEMORY].
127
RICOEUR, supra note 15, at 121.
128
See, e.g., SUSAN SONTAG: REGARDING THE PAIN OF OTHERS 26 (2003). Sontag describes
Virginia Woolf’s ideas about photography which correspond to this notion of facts as
“simply” given. Id.
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rejected the “strict separation of objectivity and subjectivity.”129 The act
of reading implies a constant give and take between the reader and the
text, and any meaning that emerges must take into account not only
what is written on the page but also what the interpreter brings to the act
of reading.130 Meaning is conveyed not only by what the author means
but also by what the reader understands.
This understanding of how meaning arises from the page bears on
legal analysis, because law is itself a product of language, laden with
traps for the unwary. Lawyers often ignore law’s irreducibly linguistic
basis. In so doing, attorneys unwittingly accept assumptions about the
ability to use language in an unambiguous way. Thus, facts are seen as
mere “givens,” an assumption which ignores the toil necessary to
translate historical events into words on a printed page. As professional
writers know, simplicity in expression, if it is to be had at all, is not the
result of a starting position that assumes the ease of accurate description;
rather, only by working through the difficulties inherent in any use of
language can one arrive at any level of clarity. To use language is
necessarily to be selective; to say something precisely is to be sensitive
both to the multiple ways words can be used and the contexts in which
words are uttered.131 Accurate transmission of meaning, saying exactly
what one means, is difficult to attain.132
ROBERT F. BERKHOFER, JR., BEYOND THE GREAT STORY: HISTORY AS TEXT AND
DISCOURSE 1 (1998). Berkhofer states:
Although the linguistic, interpretive, and rhetorical turns differed from
one another, all questioned the received viewpoint grounding the
social sciences: an ideal of scientific positivism and its corollary, the
strict separation of objectivity and subjectivity, whether as fact versus
value or as empiricism versus political and moral advocacy. Each of
the three turns stressed language, meaning, and interpretation as
central to human understanding and therefore to understanding
humans.
Id.
130
HANS GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 236 (J. Weinsheimer & D.G. Marshall
trans., 2d ed. 2003). Gadamer states:
[I]t is necessary to keep one’s gaze fixed on the thing throughout all
the distractions that originate in the interpreter himself. A person who
is trying to understand a text is always projecting. He projects a
meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning
emerges in the text. Again, the initial meaning emerges only because
he is reading the text with particular expectations in regard to a certain
meaning. Working out this fore-projection, which is constantly revised
in terms of what emerges as he penetrates into the meaning, is
understanding what is there.
Id.
131
RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS, supra note 126, at 44. Ricoeur explains:
129
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Ambiguity is Rooted in the Predicate Rather Than in the Subject of a
Sentence

Ricoeur notes that even the simplest structure for conveying
meaning—the sentence—can mask layers of ambiguity.133 Sentences are
made up of two components: a subject and a predicate. A subject has
the task of selecting out something singular; it needs to identify the agent
that acts or the object which is acted upon by the predicate.134 By
[The multiple meanings that can be attached to any given word
(polysemy) has] as its counterpart the selective role of contexts for
determining the current value which words assume in a determinate
message, addressed by a definite speaker to a hearer placed in a
particular situation. Sensitivity to context is the necessary complement
and ineluctable counterpart of polysemy. But the use of contexts
involves, in turn, an activity of discernment which is exercised in the
concrete exchange of messages between interlocutors, and which is
modelled on the interplay of question and answer. This activity of
discernment is properly called interpretation; it consists in recognising
which relatively univocal [one voice—one meaning] message the
speaker has constructed on the polysemic basis of the common lexicon.
To produce a relatively univocal discourse with polysemic words, and
to identify this intention of univocity in the reception of messages:
such is the first and most elementary work of interpretation.
Id.
PAUL RICOEUR, INTERPRETATION THEORY: DISCOURSE AND THE SURPLUS OF MEANING
15-16 (1976). He states:
[W]hat is experienced by one person cannot be transferred whole as
such and such experience to someone else. My experience cannot
directly become your experience. An event belonging to one stream of
consciousness cannot be transferred as such into another stream of
consciousness. Yet, nevertheless, something passes from me to you.
Something is transferred from one sphere of life to another. This
something is not the experience as experienced, but its meaning. Here
is the miracle. The experience as experienced, as lived, remains private,
but its sense, its meaning, becomes public.
Id.
133
See, e.g., RICOEUR, supra note 132, at 11. For Ricoeur, meaning is conveyed only in
sentences; words by themselves are necessarily polysemic and unable to convey meaning
clearly in the absence of a broader context. Id. See also RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS, supra note
126, at 169. He explains:
[T]he semantics of the word [discourse] demonstrates very clearly that
words acquire an actual meaning only in a sentence and that lexical
entities – the words of the dictionary – have merely potential meanings
in virtue of their potential uses in typical contexts. . . . At the lexical
level, words . . . have more than one meaning; it is only by a specific
contextual action of sifting that they realise, in a given sentence, a part
of their potential semantics and acquire what we call a determinate
meaning.
Id.
134
RICOEUR, supra note 132, at 10-11. The author says:
132
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contrast, the predicate is ineluctably plural. It describes and designates
“a kind of quality . . . a type of relation, or a type of action.”135 Why is
this distinction important? For Ricoeur, ambiguity, generality, and
unclear antecedents can arise in the subject, but such confusion presents
a comparatively obvious difficulty. First year law students are relatively
adept at sorting out subjects of statutes that seem over or underinclusive. Ricoeur draws attention to the predicate as a source of
confusion. Unless predication is crisply distinguished, and unless the
level of abstraction is carefully monitored and controlled, the same
predicate can and will describe a number of different actions. For
example, to say that an attorney “argued for a position” encompasses
both a dismissive two minute disagreement with opposing counsel and a
painstaking and elegant elaboration of how years of precedent compel
the court to only one conclusion.
Ricoeur’s work suggests that trivial legal ambiguities are those
which arise from defining the subject of an action; by contrast,
ambiguities which require greater attention will be those which arise
from broad predication. For example, the Strickland majority describes
Tunkey as arguing five separate points at sentencing.136 A casual reader
would believe that counsel did a great deal here. Yet, the opinion fails to
mention that his whole argument took up less than three pages of the

Subject and predicate do not do the same job in the proposition. The
subject picks out something singular – Peter, London, this table . . . –
by means of several grammatical devices which serve this logical
function: proper names, pronouns, demonstratives, (this and that . . . )
and “definite descriptions” (the so and so). What they all have in
common is that they all identify one and only one item.
Id.
Id.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 673-74 (1984). The Court explains:
At the sentencing hearing, counsel’s strategy was based primarily on
the trial judge’s remarks at the plea colloquy as well as on his
reputation as a sentencing judge who thought it important for a
convicted defendant to own up to his crime. Counsel argued that
respondent’s remorse and acceptance of responsibility justified sparing
him from the death penalty. Counsel also argued that respondent had
no history of criminal activity and that respondent committed the
crimes under extreme mental or emotional disturbance, thus coming
within the statutory list of mitigating circumstances. He further
argued that respondent should be spared death because he had
surrendered, confessed, and offered to testify against a codefendant
and because respondent was fundamentally a good person who had
briefly gone badly wrong in extremely stressful circumstances.
Id. (citation omitted).
135
136
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transcript and likely lasted less than four or five minutes.137 This fact,
once realized, undermines the image of zealousness projected by the
majority opinion.
2.

Texts Convey Meaning through Propositional Content

Another difficulty in moving from the historical event of dialogue to
the written page emerges from the gap between what Paul Grice calls the
“utterer’s meaning” and the “utterance meaning.”138 Ordinarily, people
give pride of interpretive place to the psychological intent of the author
or speaker.
This attribution stems from the way of resolving
misunderstandings in the dialogical situation. When a statement is
misunderstood in conversation, the speaker employs a number of
strategies for clarification.
First she attempts to clear up a
misunderstanding by using other words. If this attempt is insufficient to
remove the difficulty in understanding the statement, the speaker points
to some reality outside of the conversation itself.139 The force of this
approach lies not with the propositional content of spoken statements
but emphasizes rather the correspondence with external reality which is
either physically indicated or suggested by reference to unspoken

137
138

Brief for Respondent, supra note 95, at 9.
RICOEUR, supra note 132, at 12-13. Ricoeur says:
To mean is both what the speaker means, i.e., what he intends to say,
and what the sentence means, i.e., what the conjunction between the
identification function and the predicative function yields. . . . We may
connect the reference of discourse to its speaker with the event side of
the dialectic. The event is somebody speaking. In this sense, the
system or code is anonymous to the extent that it is merely virtual.
Languages do not speak, people do. But the propositional side of the
self-reference of discourse must not be overlooked if the utterer’s
meaning, to use a term of Paul Grice’s, is not to be reduced to a mere
psychological intention. The mental meaning can be found nowhere
else than in discourse itself. The utterer’s meaning has its mark in the
utterance meaning.

Id.
139

RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS, supra note 126, at 141. Ricoeur explains:
In oral discourse, the problem is ultimately resolved by the ostensive
function of discourse; in other words, reference is determined by the
ability to point to a reality common to the interlocutors. If we cannot
point to the thing about which we speak, at least we can situate it in
relation to the unique spatio-temporal network which is shared by the
interlocutors. It is the ‘here’ and ‘now’, determined by the situation of
discourse, which provides the ultimate reference of all discourse.

Id.
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common sense notions, what Habermas would call an appeal to the “lifeworld.”140
B. The Author is Erased: Three Phases of Distanciation
As one moves from spoken to written language, the key for
understanding is not “what is said” and “who says it,” but “what is
written” and “who reads it.” Ricoeur observes:
What happens to discourse when it passes from
speaking to writing? At first sight, writing seems only to
introduce a purely external and material factor: fixation,
which shelters the event of discourse from destruction.
In fact, fixation is only the external appearance of a
problem which is much more important, and which
affects all the properties of discourse. . . . [W]riting
renders the text autonomous with respect to the
intention of the author. What the text signifies no longer
coincides with what the author meant; henceforth,
textual meaning and psychological meaning have
different destinies.141
Writing not only takes the moment of speech and commits it to paper; it
also unhinges the words in the text from the restrictions of persons,

Gregory O’Meara, Habermas, Violence, and the Ultimate Reality and Meaning of Law, 26 J.
ULTIMATE REALITY & MEANING 180, 184-85 (2003). The article specifies:
‘Lifeworld’ refers to the social, intellectual, and even instinctive context
from which all of us act.
From the beginning of our lives,
communicative acts occur within a horizon, a background, of shared
beliefs, experiences, actions and thoughts.
This background
knowledge is not consciously perceived; we are, by definition, as
unaware of the lifeworld as we are of the air we breathe. Nevertheless,
we make use of the lifeworld’s horizon in arriving at decisions daily.
For example, most persons in first world countries assume that all
water that comes out of a faucet is potable. Our daily actions,
decisions, and expectations, individually and collectively, depend
upon this shared knowledge, even though we rarely consciously
apprehend that fact. More generally, because we are unaware of the
contents of the lifeworld, these contents may also be the source for
minor dissent; however, when these contents are consciously
recognized, persons are able either to set dissent rooted in
misunderstanding aside and enter into consensus with others, or they
recognize better the area of disagreement and enter into further
discussion.
Id. (citations omitted).
141
RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS, supra note 126, at 139.
140
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space, and time.142 What matters to the reader is not what the author
intended to say but what words are written on the paper in front of her.
The dialogical situation no longer exists between the speaker and the
hearer; it now occurs between the reader and the words of the printed
text. The reader cares not what the “utterer” meant; she is concerned
rather with how to decode the “utterance.”
1.

Dialogue is with the Text and Not with the Author

Reliance upon the written word necessarily entails the three-part
phenomenon Ricoeur calls “distanciation.”
The first stage of
distanciation maintains that the author is cut from the understanding of
the text itself.143 Ricoeur insists that readers approach the text as a freestanding object.144 The absence of the author as a dialogue partner
compels the reader to enter into a dialogue with the propositional
content of the text itself.145 A written text, by its very nature, limits the
142
See generally PAUL RICOEUR, supra note 132, at 25-44. Ricoeur identifies three important
changes which occur when a text is written down. Id. First, the text is separated from the
person of the author. Id. Second, the text is separated from its original audience, and third,
it is separated from its original situation or context. Id. Each of these points of
distanciation can be the locus for misunderstanding which is ineluctably tied up in the
nature of written discourse. Id.
143
Id. at 29-30. Ricoeur states:
With written discourse, however, the author’s intention and the
meaning of the text cease to coincide. This dissociation of the verbal
meaning of the text and the mental intention of the author gives to the
concept of inscription its decisive significance, beyond the mere
fixation of previous oral discourse. Inscription becomes synonymous
with the semantic autonomy of the text, which results from the
disconnection of the mental intention of the author from the verbal
meaning of the text, of what the author meant and what the text
means. . . . What the text means now matters more than what the
author meant when he wrote it.
Id.
144
Id. at 26. In describing how readers approach the text Ricoeur states:
This inscription, substituted for the immediate vocal, physiognomic, or
gestural expression, is in itself a tremendous cultural achievement.
The human fact disappears. Now material “marks” convey the
message. This cultural achievement concerns the event character of
discourse first and subsequently the meaning as well. It is because
discourse only exists in a temporal and present instance of discourse
that it may flee as speech or be fixed as writing.
Id.
145
RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS, supra note 126, at 146-47. He explains:
It does not suffice to say that reading is a dialogue with the author
through his work, for the relation of the reader to the book is of a
completely different nature. Dialogue is an exchange of questions and
answers; there is no exchange of this sort between the writer and the
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author’s ability to control how the reader interprets her words. In oral
communication, the author controls the message insofar as she can
clarify disagreements and ambiguities. Where the sole source for
avoiding ambiguity is the written word, the logic revealed by the
propositional content is the only path readers can use to clear up
difficulties with the meaning.146
2.

The Reader Provides Her Own Context

Ricoeur describes the second stage of distanciation, which explains
how meaning rests largely in the reader’s individual life experience:
[W]ritten discourse creates an audience which extends in
principle to anyone who can read. The freeing of the
written material with respect to the dialogical condition
of discourse is the most significant effect of writing. It
implies that the relation between writing and reading is
no longer a particular case of the relation between
speaking and hearing.147
The locus of meaning in interpretation of written texts shifts from the
pen of the writer to the eye of the reader. Unlike a speech event which is
addressed to a particular hearer, “a written text is addressed to an
unknown reader and potentially to whoever knows how to read.”148
One must also consider the reader’s biography and what the reader
reader. The writer does not respond to the reader. Rather, the book
divides the act of writing and the act of reading into two sides,
between which there is no communication. The reader is absent from
the act of writing; the writer is absent from the act of reading. The text
thus produces a double eclipse of the reader and the writer. It thereby
replaces the relation of dialogue, which directly connects the voice of
one to the hearing of the other.
Id.
146

Id. at 141. In particular, Ricoeur states:
[W]hat happens to reference when discourse becomes a text? Here we
find that writing, and above all the structure of the work, modify
reference to the point of rendering it entirely problematic. In oral
discourse, the problem is ultimately resolved by the ostensive function
of discourse; in other words, reference is determined by the ability to
point to a reality common to the interlocutors. If we cannot point to
the thing about which we speak, at least we can situate it in relation to
the unique spatio-temporal network which is shared by the
interlocutors. It is the ‘here’ and ‘now’, determined by the situation of
discourse, which provides the ultimate reference of all discourse.

Id.
147
148

Id. at 139.
RICOEUR, supra note 132, at 31.
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herself brings to a particular text.149 What a reader brings to a text will
color her interpretation, and these interpretations have an undeniable
validity from Ricoeur’s perspective. “It is part of the meaning of a text to
be open to an indefinite number of readers and, therefore, of
interpretations.”150 To understand what a text means is, in part, to
understand how the reader processes the information.
3.

The Author’s Context is Erased

The third mode of distanciation occurs because the text is wrested
from the original situation of the author. The reader does not share the
same space and time coordinates as the author. Ricoeur describes the
common context as “shattered by writing.”151 Because gaps between
what an author intends and what a reader perceives cannot be addressed
at the time of perceived ambiguity, these difficulties can infect all later
understanding (or lack thereof) between the author and the reader. The
reader’s understanding will, therefore, be grounded not only in the
written text but also by the reader’s own situation, which may differ
vastly from that of the writer.
These three phases of distanciation lead to a central paradox: the
meaning of a text can differ from the stated purpose of an author.
Ricoeur states:
The autonomy of the text already contains the possibility
that what Gadamer calls the “matter” of the text may
escape from the finite intentional horizon of its author;
in other words, thanks to writing, the “world” of the text
may explode the world of the author. [Emphasis in
original].152

149

GADAMER, supra note 130, at 267. Gadamer states:
[I]t is necessary to keep one’s gaze fixed on the thing throughout all
the distractions that originate in the interpreter himself. A person who
is trying to understand a text is always projecting. He projects a
meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning
emerges in the text. Again, the initial meaning emerges only because
he is reading the text with particular expectations in regard to a certain
meaning. Working out this fore-projection, which is constantly revised
in terms of what emerges as he penetrates into the meaning, is
understanding what is there.

Id.
150
151
152

RICOEUR, supra note 132, at 31-32.
Id. at 35.
RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS, supra note 126, at 139.
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The words used by the author may in fact bear more weight and convey
“more meaning” than the author intended. By using language, a writer
constantly refers back to a tradition, a history of texts laden with
references and allusions of which he is ignorant. These references and
allusions may subvert textual coherence by introducing meanings far
different from the author’s intent.153 We cannot and do not control all
that a reader may take from our words.
Despite the destabilization that emerges from moving from the
spoken to the written word, Ricoeur maintains that truth exists and is
attainable in written work, but such attainment is the result of more than
words inscribed on paper.154 Even in spoken discourse, the limitations of
language do not guarantee that ideas will be received without ambiguity
and distortion:
[W]hat is experienced by one person cannot be
transferred whole as such and such experience to
someone else. My experience cannot directly become
your experience. An event belonging to one stream of
consciousness cannot be transferred as such into another
stream of consciousness.155
Truth is not unproblematically conveyed through the force of one
author’s words. Rather, truth emerges out of the recorded confluence of
many lives. It is the result of inductive and empirical study and
indicated by the weight of experience; it is not a conclusion that can be
deduced through sheer force of will or the careful manipulation of verbal
formulae. Ricoeur maintains that the whole truth can never be fully
known.156 There is always more that can be said.

153
See id. at 174 (arguing, “the text is an autonomous space of meaning which is no
longer animated by the intention of its author; the autonomy of the text, deprived of this
essential support, hands writing over to the sole interpretation of the reader.”).
154
See, e.g., RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 498. Ricoeur writes that:
[E]vents like the Holocaust and the great crimes of the twentieth
century, situated at the limits of representation, stand in the name of
all the events that have left their traumatic imprint on hearts and
bodies: they protest that they were and as such they demand being
said, recounted, understood. This protestation, which nourishes
attestation, is part of belief: it can be contested but not refuted.
Id.
155
RICOEUR, supra note 132, at 15-16.
156
RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 498.
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C. Writing History as a Three Step Process
These limitations besetting every written text are, of course, true for
every statement of fact recounted in appellate decisions. Appellate legal
decisions are almost uniformly reduced to writing. Law, like history, is
inseparable from its written roots.157 To describe a historical event using
words is to recognize that words are not the same as the event itself.
There will be slippage in the transmission of meaning because the hearer
or reader’s imaginative reconstruction of the event will not convey the
same immediacy experienced by the original witnesses.158 Details will be
ignored or misconstrued; emotions will be dampened. Further, the
move from trial to transcript to appellate decision results in even greater
distance from the historical event. To reduce the oral and aural
performance of a trial into a silent transcript that is later distilled down
into an appellate opinion is to further narrow the ability of the reader to
apprehend the original event in its complexity and ambiguity.159
Ricoeur divides the writing of non-fiction into three phases: (1) the
documentary or archival phase, which deals with the collection of
information; (2) the explanatory phase, which consists of a chain of
“because” answers to “why” questions emerging from the information
collected; and, (3) the narrative phase, where information is put into
written form for future readers.160 These elements distinguish the
writing of non-fiction from the writing of fiction.161 He notes, “[u]nlike
157
See id. at 138. “Writing, in effect, is the threshold of language that historical knowing
has already crossed, in distancing itself from memory to undertake the three-fold
adventure of archival research, explanation, and representation. History is writing from
one end to another.” Id.
158
RICOEUR, supra note 132, at 15-16.
159
I thank Professor Daniel Blinka for highlighting this distinction for me.
160
RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 136. Ricoeur notes that this triadic structure is
taken largely from the work of Michel de Certeau. Id. Ricoeur states: “I have also adopted
the broader lines of the triadic structure of Certeau’s essay, although I give them different
contents on some important points.” Id.; see also MICHEL DE CERTEAU, THE WRITING OF
HISTORY (T. Conley trans., 1988).
161
RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 136-37. Ricoeur describes the documentary
phase as follows:
I shall call the “documentary phase” the one that runs from the
declaration of eyewitnesses to the constituting of archives, which takes
as its epistemological program the establishing of documentary proof
. . . . Next I shall call the explanation/understanding . . . phase the one
that has to do with the multiple uses of the connective “because”
responding to the question “why?” . . . Finally, I shall call the
“representative phase” the putting into literary or written form of
discourse offered to the readers of history. . . . [I]t is the phase of
writing that plainly states the historian’s intention, which is to
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novels, historians’ constructions do aim at being reconstructions of the
past.”162 Because the statement of facts in any appellate decision aims at
being “reconstructions” or representations of the past, Ricoeur’s
phenomenology of a historian’s work explains what judges do.
These three phases of non-fiction writing are “methodological
moments” rather than “distinct chronological stages” that necessarily
follow one after the other.163
For example, the introduction of
unexpected facts may require recasting the proposed explanation to
account for their occurrence. Similarly, the adoption of a particular
narrative strategy often sends the author back to the archive to look for
further evidence of her thesis. The recounting of history is a dynamic,
and not a static, phenomenon, and these phases of historical drafting are
continually interwoven and repeated as non-fiction writing continues.164
Ricoeur notes: “Each of the three operations of the historiographical
operation stands as a base for the other two, inasmuch as they serve
successively as referents for the other two.”165 Although the following
analysis will treat each phase as relatively autonomous, the three are
inseparable in operation.
1.

The Documentary Phase

Initially, Ricoeur’s description of the documentary phase, i.e., the
collection of information, draws explicit parallels between the work of an
historian and the operation of a court system.166 As at trial, the
documentary phase is defined by the use of witnesses, both human and
textual.167 The question to be determined at this phase is one of
credibility: “Whom or what should we believe and why?”168 To address
represent the past just as it happened–whatever meaning may be
assigned to this “just as.” It is also at this third phase that the major
aporias of memory return in force to the foreground, the aporia of the
representation of an absent thing that occurred previously and that of
a practice devoted to the active recalling of the past, which history
elevates to the level of a reconstruction.
Id.
RICOEUR, TIME, supra note 126, at 142.
RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 137.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id. at 162-69.
167
Id. at 162. “It is within the everyday use of testimony that the common core of its
juridical and historical use is most easily discerned.” Id.
168
Id. Ricoeur descusses witness credibility, positing:
[T]o what point is testimony trustworthy? This question balances both
confidence and suspicion. Thus it is by bringing to light the conditions
162
163
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that question, Ricoeur proposes a dialectic between the introduction and
the reception of evidence.169 As in dialogue, the question and answer
format is the vehicle that moves the gathering of information along.
Ricoeur focuses particularly on the reception of evidence by
describing the historian sifting through archived facts as the finder of
fact at trial.170 Because Ricoeur understands history according to a
judicial model, a hermeneutic of suspicion is unavoidably woven into
the fabric of recording past events.171 Beginning with the immediate
perception of historical events, every description, every recounting
received by a listener, is considered in a context alert to flaws in
perception or transmission of information. Witnesses are scrutinized for
distortions in their abilities to perceive, reasons to doubt their sincerity,
and impediments to their memory.172 Every connection between
different pieces of evidence is scrutinized as the historian tries to bring
order to the disconnected documents scattered before her. The attitude
of suspicion has no ending point so long as historians draw breath.
Indeed, Ricoeur observes that one difference between history and
judicial findings of fact is the necessary cessation of inquiry at some

in which suspicion is fomented that we have a chance of approaching
the core meaning of testimony.
Id. Of course, trials need not be about issues of credibility. Often there is no disagreement
about the facts themselves. Rather, the parties dispute what inferences should be drawn
from the facts as established. For simplicity’s sake, it seems best to focus on issues of
credibility for the purposes of this paper, but understand that this limitation leaves a host
of issues unexplored.
169
Id. at 163. Proposing a dialectic between the introduction and the reception of
evidence, Ricoeur states:
Two sides are initially distinguished and articulated in terms of one
another: on the one side, the assertion of the factual reality of the
reported event; on the other, the certification or authentification of the
declaration on the basis of its author’s experience, what we can call his
presumed trustworthiness.
Id.
170
Id. at 161-66.
171
Id. at 162. Ricoeur explains:
In effect, suspicion unfolds itself all along the chain of operations that
begin at the level of the perception of an experienced scene, continuing
on to that of the retention of its memory, to come to focus in the
declarative and narrative phase of the restitution of the features of the
event.
Id.
172
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 601-603. These attributes are among those regularly probed by
cross-examiners in a trial court and underlie policies in the Federal Rules of Evidence, such
as the rules defining the competency of witnesses. Id.
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point in judicial proceedings.173
While history is constantly reinterrogated and revised, legal descriptions of events are relatively more
stable because of the principle of finality of judgment.174
Ricoeur sees a witness’ presence at the described historical event and
reputation for trustworthiness as strategies for addressing this pervasive
suspicion. Although he alludes to the substance of the evidence to be
introduced, his approach emphasizes more the qualities of the witness
rather than the content of the witness’ testimony.175 In this vein, Ricoeur
suggests that the witness’ spatio-temporal location and ability to narrate
a coherent story carries more weight than does factual correspondence
with the historical events described.176 The act of testifying combines
both the historical event to be recounted and the biography of the
testifying witness.177
Insofar as the witness has lived a life of
comparative virtue, her personal ethos or trustworthiness imbues her
testimony with a prima facie believability. Similarly, insofar as a
witness’ life has failed to be marked by truthfulness, her testimony will
correspondingly be received with disbelief.178

RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 319-20. Commenting on the difference between
history and judicial proceedings, Ricoeur states:
It remains that the definitive character of the verdict marks the most
obvious difference between the juridical approach and the
historiographical approach to the same events: what has been judged
can be challenged by popular opinion, but not retried; non bis idem; as
for the review of the decision, it “cuts only one way.”
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 163-64.
176
Id. In discussing the relationship between the witness and her testimony, Ricoeur
argues:
The specificity of testimony consists in the fact that the assertion of
reality is inseparable from its being paired with the self-designation of
the testifying subject. The typical formulation of testimony proceeds
from this pairing: I was there. What is attested to is indivisibly the
reality of the past thing and the presence of the narrator at the place of
its occurrence. And it is the witness who first declares himself to be a
witness. . . . These . . . assertions link point-like testimony to the whole
history of a life. At the same time, the self-designation brings to the
surface the inextricable opacity of a personal history that itself has
been “enmeshed in stories.”
Id. (footnote omitted).
177
Id.
178
See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1), 404-05. Again, Ricoeur’s approach finds an echo in the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. Rules 404 and 405 set forth a general rule that litigants may
not use a witness’ character or character trait to establish circumstantial proof of the
historical events of a case. Id. Nevertheless, courts do permit relying on a witness’
173
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The reputation or character of a witness is likewise seen as relevant
under current evidence law. Although trials shun introduction of
collateral matters as a general rule, under certain conditions the Federal
Rules of Evidence permit the jury to learn about the reputation and
character of a witness, including specific instances of conduct displaying
truthfulness or untruthfulness in the past.179 At least in this regard, trial
courts do connect historical events and the lives of those who recount
them.180 Trial attorneys seem to understand this matter better than
others. The litigator constantly asks not only “what is the content of the
testimony?” but also “who is saying it?” This factor is noted in Ricoeur’s
character trait for untruthfulness to support an assertion that a witness lied on direct
examination. Id.
179
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 608-609.
Rule 608. Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character.
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence
in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations:
(1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible
only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been
attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct.
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of
attacking or supporting the witness’ character for truthfulness, other
than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by
extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on crossexamination of the witness (1) concerning the witness’ character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character
the witness being cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other
witness, does not operate as a waiver of the accused’s or the witness’
privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to
matters that relate only to character for truthfulness.
Rule 609. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime
(a) General rule.
For the purpose of attacking the character for truthfulness of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of
a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the
law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an
accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the
court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted regardless of the punishment . . . .
Id.
180
See, e.g., RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 244.
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comments on narrativity.181 Lives of actors are emplotted along with
particular events in a story, and the finder of fact may be as convinced by
the life of an actor as by what she or he says.182
Turning from the reception of evidence by the finder of fact to the
introduction of evidence, the witness’ role at the historical event shapes
her perceptions and affects the record in a case.183 When a witness
testifies in court, she is a third-person observer, trying to convey to a jury
what occurred at a particular time and place.184 This third-person role
may correspond with the witness’ experienced role at the time of the
event. It may also differ. Witnesses understand events giving rise to
testimony from a particular perspective, a story which explains how
different events or observations fit together.185 If the witness is a codefendant or a victim, there may be an emotional valence conferred by
that role that impedes the witness’ ability to apprehend and transmit the
occurrences in question.186

181
182

Id.
Id. Discussing the roles of actors in a narrative, Ricoeur states:
[I]nasmuch as the actors in a narrative–the characters–are emplotted
along with the story, the notion of narrative identification, correlative
to that of narrative coherence, too is open to noteworthy transpositions
on the historical plane. The notion of a character constitutes a
narrative operator of the same amplitude as that of an event. The
characters perform and suffer from the action recounted.

Id.
See, e.g., GADAMER, supra note 130, at 276-77. Commenting on human perceptions,
Gadamer explains:
In fact history does not belong to us; we belong to it. Long before we
understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we
understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society, and
state in which we live. The focus of subjectivity is a distorting mirror.
The self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the closed
circuits of historical life.
Id.
184
RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 164. Ricoeur argues:
Self-designation gets inscribed in an exchange that sets up a dialogical
situation. It is before someone that the witness testifies to the reality of
some scene of which he was part of the audience, perhaps as actor or
victim, yet, in the moment of testifying, he is in the position of a thirdperson observer with regard to all the protagonists of the action.
Id. (footnote omitted).
185
Id.
186
Id. See also JEROME S. BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 58-59 (1990). Bruner states:
In the actual effort to remember something, [Bartlett] notes, what most
often comes first to mind is an affect or a charged “attitude” – that “it”
was something unpleasant, something that led to embarrassment,
something that was exciting. The affect is rather like a general
183
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The act of translating a witness’ act of testifying to the written record
affects emotionally-charged content, because something is lost in the
transition from live to written testimony; in part, those reading the
record cannot experience its affective imprint, the emotional content that
underlies the words spoken.187
The text can only record the
propositional content of the testimony, i.e., the words the witness says,
not the quality of her demeanor nor the manner of her delivery. In
addition to difficulties associated with transmitting emotional valances
in a written record, the very act of putting certain experiences into words
creates certain lacunae. As Professor Elaine Scarry has observed,
physical pain is often essentially inexpressible.188 Similarly, mental
suffering is often impossible to verbalize.189 Witnesses who have
undergone traumatic experiences are often reduced to incoherent and illdefined attempts to express what they cannot articulate. Courts
traditionally defer to the trier of fact who has the immediate ability to
apprehend the demeanor of witnesses and assess their credibility, even if
such understanding is obscured by emotionally laden memories.
Nevertheless, the difficulty associated with expressing emotionally and
physically scarring events lessens the impact of such testimony in the
written record.
Ricoeur maintains that those testifying are in a dialogical
relationship not only with the examining attorney but also with the
finder of fact in court. Surely, witnesses engage in the question and
answer format that characterizes all dialogue when they are being
examined on the witness stand.190 Ricoeur maintains that the question
thumbprint of the schema to be reconstructed. “The recall is then a
construction made largely on the basis of this attitude, and its general
effect is that of a justification of the attitude.” Remembering serves, on
this view, to justify an affect, an attitude. The act of recall is “loaded,”
then, fulfilling a “rhetorical” function in the process of reconstructing
the past. It is a reconstruction designed to justify. The rhetoric, as it
were, even determines the form of “invention” we slip into in
reconstructing the past: “The confident subject justifies himself–attains
a rationalization, so to speak–by setting down more detail than was
actually present; while the cautious, hesitating subject reacts in the
opposite manner, and finds his justification by diminishing rather than
increasing the details presented [in the experiment].”
Id. (footnote omitted).
187
RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 164. “[T]he affective imprint of an event capable
of striking the witness like a blow does not necessarily coincide with the importance his
audience may attach to his testimony.” Id.
188
See ELAINE SCARRY, RESISTING REPRESENTATION 3 (1994).
189
See, e.g., JEROME A. MILLER, THE WAY OF SUFFERING: A GEOGRAPHY OF CRISIS 46 (1988).
190
RICOEUR, supra note 132, at 14-15.
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and answer structure extends further. Witnesses make assertions, and
every assertion necessarily implies the question: “And you agree, don’t
you?”191 Similarly, every witness’ testimony contains the plea, “believe
me.”192 To be a witness is to subject one’s self to challenge not only by
the cross-examiner but also by the finder of fact. “The witness is thus the
one who accepts being questioned and expected to answer what may
turn out to be a criticism of what he says.”193 There is a tension, a fear of
being contradicted or proven wrong, built into every statement made at
trial and in every assertion in documents upon which a historian relies.
The back and forth of a dialogical relationship that characterizes trial
transcripts drops out of judicial opinions reduced to writing, because,
almost uniformly, judges adopt a third-person omniscient perspective
for their published work. Thus, the written decision seems more a
pronouncement of self-evident truths than the product of ineluctably
provisional dialogue. In this regard, well-crafted opinions and histories
have an aura of inevitability about them. The reader is lulled into letting
down her hermeneutic guard and accepting a coherent account as “true”
without interrogating suspicions either discarded or consciously avoided
by the author.
Ricoeur’s description of the documentary phase undermines any
claim that there is an easy and accurate transition from historical events
to testimony presented in a courtroom. Recognition of the dynamics
underlying the presentation of evidence at trial highlights the
significance of the findings of fact by the trial court. In the absence of
One important aspect of discourse is that it is addressed to someone.
There is another speaker who is the addressee of the discourse. The
presence of the pair, speaker and hearer, constitutes language as
communication. . . . Questioning and answering sustain the movement
and the dynamic of speaking, and in one sense they do not constitute
one mode of discourse among others. Each illocutionary act is a kind
of question. To assert something is to expect agreement, just as to give
an order is to expect obedience.
Id.
Id.
RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 164. Commenting on the trust involved in
witness testimony, Ricoeur states:
This dialogical structure immediately makes clear the dimension of
trust involved: the witness asks to be believed. He does not limit
himself to saying “I was there,” he adds “believe me.” Certification of
the testimony then is not complete except through the echo response of
the one who receives the testimony and accepts it. Then the testimony
is not just certified, it is accredited.
Id.
193
Id. at 165.
191
192
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specific findings at trial, the appellate court must craft a coherent
narrative from a transcript that is stripped of emotional valances and
observations of witness demeanor. The collection of raw materials for
legal facts is the first locus of judicial discretion in determining the facts
in a case.
2.

The Explanatory Phase

a.

Selection of Facts Determines the Theory

Moving from the documentary to the explanatory phase, the initial
consideration is the selection of “salient” facts recovered in the archival
stage. Historian Tzvetan Todorov observes:
“The work of the historian, like every work on the past,
never consists solely in establishing the facts but also in
choosing certain among them as being more salient and
more significant than others, then placing them in
relation to one another. . . .”194
Facts are necessarily theory-laden. Matters are not seen as significant,
save in reference to a backdrop, a context which will either subordinate
or emphasize the fact in question. Amsterdam and Bruner observe that
certain stories fail to capture our attention because they conform to
societal expectations.195 They call such stories “scripts” that involve
“familiar characters taking appropriate actions in typical settings.”196
Insofar as what arises in the archives or court record appears to be part
of a script, it will not lead to questions to be answered in the explanatory
phase. Specifically, Ricoeur states:
[T]he document sleeping in the archives is not just silent,
it is an orphan. The testimonies it contains are detached
from the authors who “gave birth” to them. They are
handed over to the care of those who are competent to
question them and hence to defend them, by giving
them aid and assistance.197
Only facts which subvert or undermine expectations appear to have
explanatory force; other facts are ignored as part of the normal
194
TZVETAN TODOROV, LES ABUS DE LA MEMOIRE 50 (1995), in RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra
note 126, at 86.
195
AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 12, at 45.
196
Id.
197
RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 169.

http://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss3/1

O'Meara: The Name is the Same, but the Facts Have Been Changed To Protect

2008]

Changing Law by Changing Facts

731

background of life.198 The author releases these “subversive facts” from
the “orphanage” of an archive or the appellate record. But to recognize a
fact as having explanatory force, one must already possess at least an
inchoate theory of explanation.
Judges must be selective to do their job properly. The record in
complex litigation can run to hundreds and even thousands of volumes.
Even a relatively simple murder transcript can take up many banker’s
boxes. As the judge and her clerk sift through volumes of testimony,
they will, consciously or not, recognize particular facts as more
important than others, and this recognition filters out certain
explanations. Insofar as particular facts are left dormant in the archive
or record, they cannot become the basis for a decision, and the reader of
the final opinion will never know that this “orphaned” fact was
established in the trial court. The selection of facts as relevant
determines what explanations are possible, what reasons the court can
adopt.
b.

Theoretical versus Practical Reasoning

On a more abstract level, there are two different styles of reasoning
employed in the explanatory phase.199 One approach is called theoretical
reasoning, and the other is called practical reasoning.200 Theoretical
198
BRUNER, supra note 186, at 47-50. Jerome Bruner notes elsewhere that a crucial feature
of narrative is “that it specializes in the forging of links between the exceptional and the
ordinary.” Id. at 47. Part of what a narrative must do is give reasons or “make sense” of
any “encountered exception.” Id. at 49. Deviations from the expected must be justified in a
way that the ordinary need not be. Id. at 47-50. “It is this achievement that gives a story
verisimilitude.” Id. at 50.
199
RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 182. Commenting on the explanatory phase,
Ricoeur states:
To explain, generally speaking, is to answer the question “Why?”
through a variety of uses of the connector “because.” . . . If the intellect,
however, is to remain within the domain of history, and not slip over
into that of fiction, this use of the imagination [which carries our
minds] . . . far beyond the sphere of private and public memory into
the range of the possible . . . must submit itself to a specific discipline,
namely, an appropriate dividing up of its objects of reference.”
Id. (footnote omitted).
200
See ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN EDELSTON TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY, A
HISTORY OF MORAL REASONING 22-46 (1988). These two approaches are distinguished and
discussed at great length. Id. See, e.g., LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY (1969). Of
course, there are more refined explanatory methods that can be relied upon at this stage.
Id. Wittgenstein, among others, warned against the idea that only one set of methods
yielded certainty. Id. Instead, he noted that there are many different sorts of uncertainty,
and we have different ways of approaching them. Id. See also RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra
note 126, at 184-85. Ricoeur agrees with Wittgenstein’s observation:
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reasoning describes the elegant and precise calculus displayed in
geometric proofs.201 It begins with unquestioned general principles from
which all other conclusions can be derived. Theoretical reasoning is
attractive because its conclusions must be accepted if one concedes the
premises. Unfortunately, theoretical reasoning is of limited applicability
because it deals only with the idealized, the atemporal, and the
necessary.202 Theoretical reasoning is informative and helpful when
[T]here is no one privileged mode of explanation in history. This is a
feature that history shares with the theory of action to the degree that
the penultimate referent of historical discourse is those interactions
capable of engendering the social bond. It is not surprising therefore
that history unfolds the full range of modes of explanation likely to
make human interaction intelligible. On the one side, the series of
repeatable facts of quantitative history lend themselves to a causal
analysis and to the establishing of regularities that draw the idea of a
cause, in the sense of efficacy, toward that of lawfulness, toward the
model of the “if... then” relation.
Id. (footnote omitted). But see JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra, at 23. Still, as Jonsen and Toulmin
observe, from all these possible methods there are really two broad approaches to
reasoning in practical fields such as law or ethics, stating:
We inherit two distinct ways of discussing ethical issues: One of these
frames these issues in terms of principles, rules, and other general
ideas; the other focuses on the specific features of particular kinds of
moral cases. In the first way general ethical rules relate to specific
moral cases in a theoretical manner, with universal rules serving as
‘axioms’ from which particular moral judgments are deduced as
theorems. In the second, this relation is frankly practical, with general
moral rules serving as ‘maxims,’ which can be fully understood only in
terms of the paradigmatic cases that define their meaning and force.
Id.
201
JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 200, at 25. Discussing the importance of geometry’s
general principles, Jonsen and Toulmin state:
The rigor of geometry was so appealing, indeed, that for many Greek
philosophers formal deduction became the ideal of all rational
argument. . . . In due course, too (the hope was), other sciences would
find their own unquestioned general principles to serve as their
starting points, in explaining, for example, the natures of animals,
plants, and the other permanent features of the world.
Id. (footnote omitted).
202
Id. at 26-27. Johnson and Toulmin explain:
In theoretical fields such as geometry, statements or arguments were
idealized, atemporal, and necessary:
1. They were “idealized” in the following sense. Concrete physical
objects, cut out of metal in the shapes of triangles or circles, can never
be made with perfect precision. . . . The idealized “straight lines” and
“circles” of geometry, by contrast, exemplify such truths with perfect
exactness.
2. They were “atemporal” in the following sense. Any geometrical
theorem that is true at one time or on one occasion will be true at any
time and on any occasion. . . .
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talking about mathematical entities, but its usefulness diminishes outside
that rarefied sphere.
Aristotle observed, “[n]ot all of our
knowledge . . . is of this sort; nor do we have this theoretical kind of
certainty in every field.”203
c.

Law Uses Practical Reasoning

Although lawyers frame arguments as though they rest on
theoretical reasons as a matter of style, they actually rely on practical
reasoning.204 Theoretical reasoning is rhetorically preferred because of
the potency associated with results that are logically necessary. Insofar
as an argument rests on unquestioned principles, it cannot be supplanted
by positions that emanate from shakier foundations. However, when
these supposedly unassailable principles are interrogated, they are
usually found to lack the underpinnings of geometric certainty. Jonsen
and Toulmin make the distinction in this way:
In the realm of Practice, certitude no longer requires a
prior grasp of definitions, general principles, and
axioms, as in the realm of Theory. Rather, it depends on
accumulated experience of particular situations; and this
practical experience gives one a kind of wisdom–
phronesis–different from the abstract grasp of any
theoretical science–episteme. . . . The realm of the
3. Finally, theoretical arguments were “necessary” in a twofold sense.
The arguments of Euclidean geometry depended for their validity both
on the correctness of the initial axioms and definitions and on the inner
consistency of the subsequent deductions. Granted Euclid’s axioms,
all of his later theorems were “necessary consequences” of those initial
truths. If any of the theorems were questioned, conversely, this
implied either that their starting point was incorrect or else that the
steps taken in passing to the theorems were formally fallacious.
Id.
203
204

Id. at 25 (citing ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS VI, iii-vii).
JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 200, at 31. Jonsen and Toulmin state:
[P]ractical fields such as law, medicine, and public administration deal
with concrete actual cases, not with abstract idealized situations. They
are directly concerned with immediate facts about specific situations
and individuals: general ideas concern them only indirectly, as they
bear on the problems of those particular individuals. Unlike natural
scientists, who are free to decide in advance which types of situations,
cases, or individuals they may (or need not) pay attention to,
physicians, lawyers, and social service workers face myriad
professional problems the moment any client walks through the
door. . . . [T]hey cannot choose to ignore them or their problems.

Id.
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practical included, for Aristotle, the entire realm of
ethics: in his eyes the subject matter of moral reflection
lay within the sphere of practical wisdom rather than
theoretical comprehension.205
Rather than addressing ideal constructs which are based on truths
always valid at all times and places, legal reasoning, like moral
reflection, works with categories that are “concrete, temporal, and
presumptive.”206 Practical reasoning underscores the importance of fact
determinations because it is precisely the recounting of historical events
which provides the concrete component of legal analysis.
Ricoeur’s discussion of practical reasoning contains the central
argument of this Article. For Ricoeur, practical reasoning serves as the
vehicle for agreement among opposed parties. To reach agreement,
interlocutors adjust their descriptions of historical events until (1) there is
an agreed upon recounting of the past and (2) each party perceives his or
her respective position as honored and accepted. Attorneys and judges
arrive at agreement by adjusting factual descriptions as well. This
conclusion is illustrated by Ricoeur’s example of map-making.
d.

Practical Reasoning is Distorted When Narratives Change Descriptive
Scale

Ricoeur draws our attention to scales of reference used in
cartography, optics, and architecture.207 The idea of scale is relatively
Id. at 26.
Id. at 27. Toulmin and Jonsen make the distinction by comparing the sorts of
discussion one can have about triangles with the sort of discussion one has about chickens:
In all three respects, practical statements and arguments differed from
theoretical ones by being concrete, temporal, and presumptive.
1. They were “concrete” in the following sense. Chickens are never
idealized entities, and the things we say about cooking make no
pretense to geometrical perfection. . . .
2. They were “temporal” in this sense. The same experience that
teaches what is normally the case at any time also teaches what is the
case only sometimes . . . Truths of practical experience thus do not hold
good “universally” or “at any time”: rather, they hold “on occasion” or
“at this or that moment” – that is, usually, often, at most always.
3. Finally, practical arguments were “presumptive” in this sense.
Chicken is normally good to eat, so a particular chicken just brought
from the store is “presumably” good to eat. In unusual cases that
conclusion may be open to rebuttal . . . .
Id.
207
RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 210-11. Commenting on scale, Ricouer explains:
The notion of scale is borrowed from cartography, architecture, and
optics. In cartography, there is an external referent, the territory that
205
206
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straightforward. To define the scale of a map is to identify the units of
comparative measurement. The distance graphically represented in a
map corresponds in direct proportion with real distances in the
geographical area shown. The level of detail, i.e., what is shown on a
map, is a function of the scale chosen. When the scale on a map is
altered, certain features appear and disappear.208 By selecting the scale
used, the cartographer selects what is revealed and concealed.
Because of external referents involved, changing the scale of a map
depicting a geographic location is relatively unproblematic. One can
locate physical realities represented on the map. Assume the situation
where the map-reader is accustomed to a map employing the scale of
one inch to a mile. Assume further that this same map-reader must later
rely on a map depicting the same area that uses a scale of one inch to five
miles. Even if familiar features are missing from the second map
because of the difference in scale, the map-reader can still use the map
with fewer streets or geographic references by focusing on the main
thoroughfares depicted. Once the reader locates a major landmark, the
second map becomes helpful.
By contrast, changing the scale of reference where there is no
corresponding physical referent presents a more perplexing difficulty.
Ricoeur considers questions of scale in the context of architecture and
urban planning.209 The complexity arises from the lack of clear physical
signposts to orient the observer’s understanding. Ricoeur observes:
[U]nlike the relationship between map and territory, the
architect’s or urban planner’s plan has as its referent a
building, a town, yet to be constructed. What is more,
the building or the town have varying relations with
their contexts scaled in terms of nature, the landscape,

the map represents. What is more, the distances measured by maps of
different scales are commensurable according to homothetic relations,
which authorizes us to speak of the reduction of a terrain to a given
scale. However, from one scale to another we observe a change in the
level of information as a function of the level of organization.
Id.
Id. at 210. Ricoeur states, “[t]he key idea attached to the idea of a variation in scale is
that, when we change scale, what becomes visible are not the same interconnections but
rather connections that remained unperceived at the macrohistorical scale.” Id.
209
Id. at 211. Ricoeur explains, “[t]he role of the idea of scale in architecture and in urban
planning is also relevant to our discussion. Proportional relations comparable to those in
cartography are posited along with the balance between gain and loss of information
depending on the scale chosen.” Id.
208
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communication networks, the already constructed parts
of the town, and so on.210
Because the proposed building needs to fit into already-existing
frameworks of buildings, geography, and infra-structure, there are
limitations on how expansive a planned structure can be. Nevertheless,
even within these limitations, it can be difficult to visualize the final
product without careful attention to scale of the plans. The ability to
apprehend what a new town or subdivision will look like requires an act
of imagination and projection. Constant movement occurs between
what is concretely present and known, and what is planned.211 It is by
holding to this dialectic between the real and the intended that plans
conform to spatial demands and are able to be given solid expression.
Ricoeur describes the profession of the historian (and by analogy
that of the judge) as in some sense architectural.212 Just as the architect
has set coordinates and limitations into which she must fit her proposed
design, so too historians have limitations with which they must contend
while drafting history. They are constrained by the facts in the archive,
and their constructions of historical events cannot differ dramatically
from previous work in the area without significant justification for such
a deviation.213 Likewise, judges are similarly constrained by the
traditions of which they are a part. Their decisions need to fit into
categories that will be sensible to other professionals working in the
field.214 Like architects and historians, judges must survey the land and
determine where and how a new structure will be integrated into the
already-existing body of law.215
210
211

Id.
GADAMER, supra note 130, at 291. Gadamer explains:
[T]he movement of understanding is constantly from the whole to the
part and back to the whole. Our task is to expand the unity of the
understood meaning centrifugally. The harmony of all the details with
the whole is the criterion of correct understanding. The failure to
achieve this harmony means that understanding has failed.

Id.
RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 211.
Id. Ricoeur states, “[h]istorical discourse has to be built up in the form of a set of
works. Each work gets inserted into an already existing environment. Rereadings of the
past are in this way reconstructions, at the price sometimes of costly demolitions:
construct, deconstruct, reconstruct are familiar gestures to the historian.” Id.
214
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 228-30 (1986) (Dworkin’s notion of “fit”
from the idea of law as integrity in his model of the chain novel). Id.
215
RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 320-21. Ricoeur explains:
[T]he fit that the judgment establishes between the presumed truth of
the narrative sequence and the imputability by reason of which the
212
213
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This analogy of law with architecture limps because verbal
constructions lack the solidity of structures made of steel and stone.
How buildings fit into a landscape has clearer boundaries and clearer
criteria for comparing different projects than does defining limits of
verbal formulae. The slippage that occurs in transmitting thoughts from
one person to another comes to the fore when trying to determine how a
proposed fact description compares with other descriptions of the same
facts found by the lower court (to say nothing of how a given description
can be compared to fact patterns set forth in completely different
cases).216 Ricoeur believes that the locus of this distortion is “the absence
of commensurability of the dimensions.”217 More simply put, people use
different words to describe the same thing or the same words to describe
different things. This lack of precision leads to confusion, because there
is no external referent against which to compare the expressions
employed.218 Ricoeur explains how the change in scale changes the
explanation:
In changing scale, one does not see the same things as
larger or smaller. . . . One sees different things. One can
no longer speak of a reduction of scale. There are
different concatenations of configuration and causality.
The balance between gains and losses of information
applies to the modeling operations that bring into play
different heuristic imaginary forms. In this regard, what
we can reproach in macrohistory is its failure to notice
its dependence on a choice of scale with its macroscopic
optical point of view that it borrowed from a more
cartographical than historical model.219
Just as historians are “subject to reproach” for failing to note how
their verbal constructions are dependent on scale, so too are attorneys
and judges. As indicated by Dean Pound and Professor Goodhart, the
very malleability of factual description permits legal decisions to rest on
bases that none of the parties to a lawsuit would recognize as emerging

accused is held accountable–this good fit in which explanation and
interpretation come together at the moment the verdict is pronounced–
operates only within the limits traced out by the prior selection of the
protagonists and of the acts alleged.
Id.
216
217
218
219

RICOEUR, supra note 132, at 15-16.
RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 211.
Id.
Id. at 211-12.
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out of their dispute.220 Because the change in scale alters which
explanatory chains are visible or operative, any relatively adequate
understanding of the stakes in a given case requires careful attention to
the scale the court employs when viewing the evidence in the record.
Failure to address problems of scale in an appellate brief may well result
in a failure before the court. Nevertheless, despite one’s best efforts,
difficulty may occur because language lacks the solidity of bricks and
mortar.
Moving from the abstract to the concrete, the different versions of
the crime story in Strickland and their implications for the ensuing
representation stories highlight how the change in scale changes the
reasoning. By truncating facts presented in the lower courts in her
version of the crime story, Justice O’Connor suggested there was nothing
remarkable about Washington’s crimes or life history. Thus, the chains
of reasoning which indicated error to the lower courts where Tunkey
failed to hire a psychologist or investigate the defendant’s background
fell by the wayside. This maneuver could not be accomplished if the
scale of the facts, the density of description, held constant in both the
Supreme Court and lower court opinions.
3.

The Narrative Phase

The third stage in non-fiction writing is called the narrative phase,
which designates composition, putting words on paper. Here the author
takes materials gathered in the documentary phase and weaves them
together with “because” explanations developed in the explanatory
phase. As previously indicated, all descriptions of historical events, all
understandings, are rooted in narratives explaining them.221 For this
reason, it is difficult to separate key features of the narrative process
from the other phases which are already bound and defined by
narratives. Authors such as Bruner, Amsterdam, Austin Sarat, and
Thomas R. Kearns have explored some implications of narrative and
law;222 their work is indebted in some measure to the masterful
220
See, e.g., supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text (describing the opinions of Dean
Pound and Professor Goodhart).
221
RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 239. Ricoeur argues, “no one ignores the fact
that before becoming an object of historical knowledge, the event is the object of some
narrative. In particular, the narratives left by contemporaries occupy a prime place among
documentary sources.” Id.
222
See, e.g., AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 12; see also JEROME BRUNER, MAKING
STORIES: LAW, LITERATURE, LIFE (2002) (resting upon the foundation developed in Bruner’s
earlier works); JEROME BRUNER, supra note 186; JEROME BRUNER, ACTUAL MINDS, POSSIBLE
WORLDS (1986); THE RHETORIC OF LAW (A. Sarat and T. R. Kearns eds., 1994).
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scholarship of the late Robert Cover, who wrote persuasively about law
and narrative.223 Cover offers a concise introduction to the interaction
between law and narrative, stating:
We inhabit a nomos - a normative universe. We
constantly create and maintain a world of right and
wrong, of lawful and unlawful, of valid and void. . . . No
set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from
the narratives that locate it and give it meaning. For
every constitution there is an epic, for each decalogue a
scripture. Once understood in the context of the
narratives that give it meaning, law becomes not merely
a system of rules to be observed, but a world in which
we live.224
In a profound way, we are made up of the stories that shape and define
our lives. As Professor Cover indicates, these stories, these narratives,
ground our laws and legal institutions.
Despite some overlap, the explanatory and narrative phases are
distinct steps in the operation of writing.225 The explanatory phase
consists of “because” explanations to a chain of “why” questions taken
from facts elicited in the documentary/archival phase.226
These
“because” statements are linked by the judge attempting to understand if
and why one series of events occurred rather than another. By contrast,
the narrative phase does not add any new causal linkages to answer

Robert Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 4 (1983).
224
Id. at 4-5.
225
RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 238. Drawing a distinction between the
explanatory and narrative phases, Ricoeur states:
On the one hand, it is taken for granted that narrativity does not
constitute an alternative solution to explanation/understanding,
despite what the adversaries and advocates of a thesis that, to be brief,
I have proposed calling narrativist curiously agree on in saying. On
the other, it is affirmed that emplotment nevertheless constitutes a
genuine component of the historiographical operation, but on another
plane than the one concerned with explanation/understanding, where
it does not enter into competition with uses of “because” in the causal
or even the teleological sense. . . . [R]epresentation in its narrative
aspect. . . does not add something coming from the outside to the
documentary and explanatory phases, but rather accompanies and
supports them.
Id.
226
Id. at 182.
223
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these initial “why” questions.227 Rather, narrative provides a rhetorical
structure that supports and accompanies this second phase.228
Because historical events are recounted through the particular lens
offered by witnesses, appellate legal narratives “normalize” actions and
situations that otherwise appear quite strange. For most people, what
structures our identity and self image is less the result of “grand textures
of cause and effect” and more those explanations occurring within “local
frames of awareness,” what Clifford Geertz calls “local knowledge.”229
These individual stories arise out of everyday experience and provide us
with a site from which we can view and evaluate what goes on in the
world outside us.230 Insofar as legal narratives consist largely of stories
describing “local frames of awareness[,]” the reader cannot easily
determine if the author is adjusting the scale of description in a given
situation. Thus, the author can select facts which make the extraordinary
seem unimportant. This normalization process emerges in a dialectic of
highlighting and subordinating facts recounted.
The narrative phase highlights or subordinates causal explanation
through the device of plot. As Ricoeur puts it:
What is a plot? . . . [A] story[] describes a sequence of
actions and experiences of a certain number of
characters, whether real or imaginary. These characters
are represented in situations which change or to the
changes of which they react. These changes, in turn,
Id. at 238.
Id.
229
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE:
FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE
ANTHROPOLOGY 6 (1983).
230
See, e.g., RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS, supra note 126, at 278. Describing narrative,
Ricoeur states:
[I]t must be said that any narrative combines, in varying proportions,
two dimensions: a chronological dimension and a non-chronological
dimension. The first may be called the ‘episodic dimension’ of the
narrative. Within the art of following a story, this dimension is
expressed in the expectation of contingencies which affect the story’s
development; hence it gives rise to questions such as: and so? and
then? what happened next? . . . But the activity of narrating does not
consist simply in adding episodes to one another; it also constructs
meaningful totalities out of scattered events. This aspect of the art of
narrating is reflected, on the side of following a story, in the attempt to
‘grasp together’ successive events. The art of narrating, as well as the
corresponding art of following a story, therefore require that we are
able to extract a configuration from a succession.
Id. (italics in original).
227
228
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reveal hidden aspects of the situation and the characters,
giving rise to a new predicament which calls for thought
or action or both. The response to this predicament
brings the story to its conclusion.231
The narrative phase works with the facts selected and explanations
forged in previous phases by framing them to underscore some
arguments and to obscure others.232 For example, in Strickland, Justice
O’Connor emphasizes the uncooperative client rather than focusing on
the attorney who did little. The representation story paints the defense
attorney as the victim of circumstances caused by his client. In contrast,
the lower court decisions develop the crime story suggesting a disturbed
defendant whose attorney abrogated his responsibility. By emphasizing
certain facts, the Strickland majority developed a plotline in which
Tunkey’s actions were vindicated because he had no other practicable
choices.
This role reversal depicted in the competing storylines of the
Strickland opinions emphasizes how fundamental the selection of
characters and events is in telling a story. These two aspects of narrative
define a story and move it along. They are linked because they have a
similar point of emergence, i.e., they each stand in contrast to what
counts as background or the status quo.233 The explanatory phase selects
problematic facts and chooses to explain why they are problems. To
identify a matter as problematic, the explanation rests on a series of
assumptions about when the story begins and what counts as
“normal.”234 At the level of structure, historical change occurs when
what was once seen as normal, unimportant, mere background, is
suddenly seen as upsetting expectations, as a discordant note.235 When
Id. at 277.
See, e.g., GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK
372 (2d Ed. 2002). The concept of framing is largely self-explanatory. Id. Lakoff argues
that it refers to the point of view in which a position or argument is couched, stating:
Alternative framing possibilities also provide for forms of everyday
variation in meaning. . . . Suppose you have a friend named Harry who
doesn’t like to spend much money. You could conceptualize him and
describe him in two different ways. You could say either “He’s
thrifty” or “He’s stingy.” Both sentences indicate that he doesn’t
spend much money, but the first frames the issue in terms of resource
preservation (thrift), while the second frames the issue in terms of
generosity (stinginess).
Id.
233
AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 12, at 44.
234
RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 243-44.
235
Id. at 243.
231
232
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an occurrence that was once seen as trivial becomes an integral part of
the plot, that episode is called an event.236
Who counts as an actor in drafting a narrative is no less important
than what counts as an event.237 This observation highlights the notion
of who is portrayed as having choices and the opportunity to act on
them. Mere stock characters who act in wholly predictable ways are
essentially freed from responsibility vis-à-vis anything important that
occurs in the narrative. Their actions seem more on the level of stimulus
response and, as such, blend into the background. By contrast, if a
character is capable of making choices, if the character has suffered or
agonized over a decision, then this character can perform actions that
move the plot forward.238
Because the crime story and the representation story interlock in
Strickland, the treatment of character and event in the crime story
determines what appears normal or expected in the representation story.
The extensive and detailed description of the defendant’s background
and offenses in the lower courts contrast with Justice O’Connor’s brief
rendering of these facts. By underplaying the defendant’s brutal
childhood and his blood-drenched crimes, the Court makes the
defendant’s actions seem less horrifying and thus less indicative of
mental disturbance; as a result, Tunkey’s failure to act seems less
culpable. Insofar as Washington’s background and crimes are rendered
“normal,” part of a script, Tunkey’s lack of action seems an appropriate
response, and is all that could reasonably be required when facing this
ordinary case.
4.

Legal Lessons Learned from Ricoeur

In summary, what emerges from Ricoeur’s three-part process are a
number of themes to bear in mind when addressing the facts in appellate
opinions. First, the statement of facts in appellate opinions is a linguistic
construction rather than an unerring representation of historical
236
237

Id.
Id. at 244. Ricouer describes narrative, stating:
[I]nasmuch as the actors in a narrative–the characters–are emplotted
along with the story, the notion of narrative identification, correlative
to that of narrative coherence, too is open to noteworthy transpositions
on the historical plane. The notion of a character constitutes a
narrative operator of the same amplitude as that of an event. The
characters perform and suffer from the action recounted.

Id.
238

Id.
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events.239 Judges write different versions of the facts just as historians
construct different and opposed narratives about the same events.240 It is
difficult to describe precisely any historical event, and good judges are
subject to the same limitations the best historians are.
Second, the way the facts are rendered by a court becomes more
important than “what actually happened,” just as the recounting of
history in a written text suppresses and surpasses the historical event
described.241 The reader has no access to the historical event; her only
access is to the words that are written down.242 What constitutes a “fact”
for the purposes of law is not the transitory and evanescent historical
event itself, but rather the description of it reduced to words either by
the witnesses on the record, attorneys in their briefs, or the judge in
writing the appellate decision.243 Historical events are fleeting moments
239

Id. at 179. In particular, Ricoeur states:
What is one talking about when one says that something happened?
. . .[I]t is to preserve this status of the reference of historical discourse
that I distinguish the fact as “something said,” the “what” of historical
discourse, from the event as “what one talks about,” the “subject
of . . .” that makes up historical discourse. In this regard, that assertion
of a historical fact indicates the distance between the said (the thing
said) and the intended reference, which according to one of
Benveniste’s expressions turns discourse back toward the world. The
world, in history, is past human life as it happened. . . . To get there,
we need to leave underdetermined the question of the actual relation
between fact and event, and tolerate a certain indiscrimination in the
employment by the best historians of these terms as standing for each
other.

Id.
Id. at 241-42. Discussing the manner in which historians interpret facts, Ricouer
argues:
The problem is posed that will be the torment of any literary
philosophy of history: what difference separates history from fiction,
if both narrate? The classic answer that history alone retraces what
actually happened does not seem to be contained in the idea that the
narrative form has within itself a cognitive function. This aporia,
which we can call that of the truth of history, becomes apparent
through the fact that historians frequently construct different and
opposed narratives about the same events. Should we say that some
omit events and considerations that others focus on and vice versa?
The aporia would be warded off if we could add rival versions to one
another, allowing for submitting the proposed narratives to the
appropriate corrections.
Id.
241
Id. at 241.
242
Id. at 242.
243
Id. at 178-79. Ricoeur states:
A vigilant epistemology will guard here against the illusion of
believing that what we call a fact coincides with what really happened,
240
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that occupy a definite set of space and time coordinates. These events
are observed by different people from various vantage points, and each
witness has individual biases and virtues. Naturally, testimony about a
given event may diverge. This starting point for all information to be
transmitted illustrates the difficulty of determining how a given
rendition of the facts corresponds with particular historical events. Once
a history is established, once a text is written down, it develops a life of
its own.244 When an historical event is enshrined in written record, it
endures. The text itself shapes memory of what occurred; its very
longevity will eventually “eclipse” the historical event.245
Third, the text’s eclipsing of the historical event makes the drafting
of facts particularly susceptible to authorial manipulation, such as the
exercise of judicial discretion. Ricoeur’s explanation indicates that there
are many ways history or the statement of facts in a case can be
constructed.246 As Barak observes, the choice among such narratives is

or with the living memory of eyewitnesses, as if the facts lay sleeping
in the documents until the historians extracted them.
This
illusion . . . for a long time underlay the conviction that the historical
fact does not differ fundamentally from the empirical fact in the
experimental natural sciences. . . . [W]e need to resist this initial
confusion between a historical fact and a really remembered event.
The fact is not the event, itself given to the conscious life of a witness,
but the contents of a statement meant to represent it.
Id.
RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS, supra note 126, at 134 (“The surpassing of the event by the
meaning is characteristic of discourse as such.”).
245
Id. at 149. Ricoeur argues:
The eclipse of the circumstantial world by the quasi-world of texts can
be so complete that, in a civilisation of writing, the world itself is no
longer what can be shown in speaking but is reduced to a kind of
‘aura’ which written works unfold. Thus we speak of the Greek world
or the Byzantine world. This world can be called ‘imaginary’ in the
sense that it is represented by writing in lieu of the world presented by
speech; but this imaginary world is itself a creation of literature.
Id. (italics in original).
246
RICOEUR, MEMORY, supra note 126, at 339-40. Ricouer discusses narrative, stating:
Concerning the narrative, no one is unaware that one can always
recount in another way, considering the selective nature of all
emplotment; and one can play with different types of plot and other
rhetorical strategies, just as one can choose to show rather than to
recount. All this is well known. The uninterrupted series of
rewritings, in particular on the level of narratives of great scope, testify
to the untamable dynamics of the work of writing in which the genius
of the writer and the talent of the artisan are expressed together.
However, by identifying interpretation and representation without
qualification, we deprive ourselves of the distinct instrument of
244
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legal and therefore a proper locus for the exercise of judicial discretion.247
Remington would see the construction of facts as a likely place for the
exercise of discretion because it takes place largely out of the public eye,
in the judge’s chambers; thus, this behavior is unlikely to be regulated
and leaves the actor free to make choices he might not otherwise make.248
Remington would also predict the exercise of discretion in drafting facts
where the legislature and courts have prevented changing the law in
post-AEDPA habeas challenges. By restricting the ability to address
possible qualms about existing law in these cases, it seems likely that
discretion will not disappear but rather shift, not to a different actor in
this case, but to a different function performed by the same actor, i.e., the
drafting of the facts.249
Before moving from theory to application, one must bear in mind
that the choice of factual narratives is a moral one; courts act in ethically
important ways when they describe events. Cover addressed the
consequences of applying what may seem an abstract legal framework
by actors applying the law.
“Law” is never just a mental or spiritual act. A legal
world is built only to the extent that there are
commitments that place bodies on the line. . . . [T]he
interpretive commitments of officials are realized,
indeed, in the flesh. As long as that is so, the
interpretive commitments of a community which resists
official law must also be realized in the flesh, even if it
be the flesh of its own adherents.250
As Michel Foucault continually pointed out, discourses of knowledge
create that which they describe. Rather than presupposing “the
enigmatic treasure of ‘things’” before discourse, Foucault reminds us
that our speech and our stories have consequences in the real world. The
careful interpreter sees “the regular formation of objects that emerge
only in discourse.”251 If our description of a phenomenon acts to create
that phenomenon, as description must in a legal system rooted in
analysis, interpretation already functioning at the other stages of
historiographical activity.
Id.
BARAK, supra note 14, at 7, 8.
Remington, supra note 105, at 75.
249
Id. at 99.
250
Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1605 (1986).
251
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE DISCOURSE ON
LANGUAGE 47 (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., 1972).
247
248

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 3 [2008], Art. 1

746

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

precedent, then our act of describing is itself subject to moral constraints.
How we describe the facts in a case affects not only the immediate
litigants before the court but also those whose cases will be affected by
the precedent set. The consequences of a dishonest or careless
description will be “realized in the flesh” of human beings.252
V. APPLICATION: HOW CHANGING FACTS CHANGES THE LAW - STRICKLAND
AND ITS UNEXPECTED PROGENY
To clarify, I would like to resurrect the model of the post-AEDPA
stainless steel fact-sorter to determine which facts would permit relief
from a habeas court on the basis of the crime and representation
narratives described by the Strickland majority. An honest reading of the
facts in Justice O’Connor’s opinion reveals that the following combined
actions should not result in relief if the Strickland rule is unchanged: (1)
an attorney’s failure to investigate a defendant’s family history; (2) an
attorney’s failure to talk with a defendant’s employers; (3) an attorney’s
failure to consult a defendant’s neighbors; (4) an attorney’s failure to
request psychological experts; and, (5) an attorney’s failure to request a
presentence report. Furthermore, if one considers facts in the record
unmentioned by the Court: (1) the attorney’s failure to read a
competency report ordered in the instant case; and, (2) his failure to
argue at sentencing for even five minutes on these three brutal cases,
were not held to support an ineffective assistance claim.
A. The Rule in Strickland
Having dealt with the facts, let us now consider the rules or norms at
work in these cases. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the
right to an attorney.253 Not until the Supreme Court case of Strickland v.
Washington did the Supreme Court flesh out important contours of this
constitutional right. Although earlier cases stated that such counsel
must be “effective,” the Court’s pre-Strickland decisions considered only
affirmative governmental interference with representation rather than
252
253

Cover, supra note 250, at 1605.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The text of the Sixth Amendment reads as follows:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

Id.
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addressing the substance of the defense attorney’s actions or failures to
act.254 Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Strickland observed, “[t]he
Court has not elaborated on the meaning of the constitutional
requirement of effective assistance in . . . those [cases] presenting claims
of ‘actual ineffectiveness.’”255
Justice O’Connor announced the Strickland rule as follows: “The
benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether
counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced
a just result.”256 The Court found that this standard also held for a
capital sentencing hearing because this proceeding “is sufficiently like a
trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of standards for
decision.”257 This decision has been commonly expressed as a two-part
test.258 The first prong requires that the defendant must show that trial
counsel’s performance was deficient.259 Second, the defendant must
prove that this deficient performance prejudiced the defense.260 The test
for the deficient performance prong is whether counsel’s representation
fell below “objective standard of reasonableness.”261 In applying this
test, trial counsel is “strongly presumed to have rendered adequate
assistance and to have made all significant decisions in the exercise of
reasonable professional judgment.”262 The performance prong should be
analyzed in light of performance at the time of trial or capital sentencing;
by contrast, the prejudice prong is analyzed under existing law at the
time of the ineffectiveness challenge.263

254
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. “Government violates the right to effective assistance when
it interferes in certain ways with the ability of counsel to make independent decisions
about how to conduct the defense.” Id. See, e. g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976)
(bar on attorney-client consultation during overnight recess); Herring v. New York, 422
U.S. 853 (1975) (bar on summation at bench trial); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612-13
(1972) (requirement that defendant be first defense witness); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S.
570, 593-96 (1961) (bar on direct examination of defendant). But see Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446
U.S. 335, 344 (1980). Counsel, however, can also deprive a defendant of the right to
effective assistance, simply by failing to render “adequate legal assistance.” Id. An actual
conflict of interest adversely affecting lawyer’s performance renders assistance ineffective.
Id. at 345-50.
255
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
256
Id.
257
Id. at 668, 686-87 (footnotes omitted).
258
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003).
259
Id.
260
Id. at 534; accord, Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1993).
261
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
262
Id. at 690.
263
Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 369.
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B. While Claiming Adherence to Strickland, Facts Change the Rule in Later
Cases
Initially, the Court expanded the class of relevant facts in the
ineffective assistance case of Williams v. Taylor.264 The Williams Court
held that Strickland’s deficient performance prong was met by the
defendant when counsel “either failed to discover or failed to offer”
evidence of mitigation in a capital sentencing proceeding.265 The Court,
in reaching its decision, observed, inter alia, that counsel did not begin to
prepare for the sentencing phase until a week before trial.266 Counsel
failed to conduct an investigation that would have uncovered extensive
records of the defendant’s “nightmarish childhood[,]” including
mistreatment, abuse, and neglect in early childhood, as well as testimony
that he was “borderline mentally retarded,” had suffered numerous
head injuries, and might have had “mental impairments organic in
origin.”267 This failure to investigate was found not to be based on any
strategic calculation, but caused by counsels’ incorrect belief that the
state barred access to these records.268 Even Justice Rehnquist’s dissent
“assume[d] without deciding that counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness.”269
That these facts are found relevant in Williams, based on a strict
application of Strickland, is surprising.270 The Court underscores its
commitment to the Strickland test, maintaining that neither the “clarity of
the rule nor the extent to which the rule must be seen as ‘established’ by
this Court” is in any way minimized or “obviate[d]” by the decision.271
Nevertheless, the facts cited by the Williams Court differ markedly from
those considered relevant by the majority in Strickland. In Williams, the
failure to investigate becomes the lodestar of the decision while it was
simply a peripheral matter in Strickland. The extreme facts in Williams
permit the Court to base its deviation from Strickland on the language of
evaluating the facts on a case-by-case basis, but later cases demonstrate a
continued willingness to broaden the scope of facts considered. 272

264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
Id. at 393.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 370, 395-96.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 418 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 391.
Id.
Id.
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Although the Court in both Wiggins and Rompilla repeats the holding
of Strickland as the governing law, and although the governing law in
both was subject to the restrictions of AEDPA, the way the Court
describes the facts in these cases raises the bar for attorney performance
from the position mapped out by the Strickland majority.273 In Wiggins,
the defendant argued that his attorneys’ failure to investigate his
background and present mitigating evidence of his unfortunate life
history at his capital sentencing hearing violated his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.274 The defendant was found guilty of first degree
murder, robbery, and two counts of theft.275 He elected to be sentenced
by a jury because he faced the death penalty.276 Before sentencing, his
attorneys filed a motion to bifurcate the sentencing hearing in hopes of
presenting his defense in two phases.277 Phase one was to prove that
Wiggins was not a “principal in the first degree,” i.e., he did not kill the
victim with his own hand.278 If the jury failed to accept this approach,
phase two of his defense would have been to present a mitigation case.279
The trial court denied the bifurcation motion and immediately
proceeded to the sentencing hearing.280 Despite the defense attorney’s
promise to the jury that they would hear that Wiggins had had a difficult
life, counsel introduced no evidence of Wiggins’ life history.281 Before
closing, Wiggins’ other attorney made a proffer to the trial court, outside
See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 529 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (citations omitted). “We
established the legal principles that govern claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in
Strickland v. Washington. . . .” Id. “Contrary to the dissent’s contention, we made no new
law in resolving Williams’ ineffectiveness claim . . . [and the Court noted] that the merits of
Williams’ claim ‘are squarely governed by our holding in Strickland.’” Id. at 522 (citations
omitted.) See also Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct 2456, 2462 (2005).
Rompilla’s entitlement to federal habeas relief turns on showing that
the state court’s resolution of his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel under Strickland . . resulted in a decision that was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States. . . . Ineffective assistance under Strickland is deficient
performance by counsel resulting in prejudice . . . with performance
being
measured
against
an
objective
standard
of
reasonableness . . under prevailing norms.
Id. (citing Washington, 466 U.S. at 687-88).
274
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 514.
275
Id. at 515.
276
Id.
277
Id.
278
Id.
279
Id.
280
Id.
281
Id.
273
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of the jury’s presence, to preserve the bifurcation motion for appeal.282 In
this offer of proof, he detailed the mitigation case counsel would have
presented had court granted their bifurcation motion, including
psychological records and expert testimony demonstrating Wiggins’
limited intellectual capacities and childlike emotional state, the absence
of aggressive patterns in his behavior, his capacity for sympathy, and his
desire to function in the world.283 At no point was any of this evidence
placed before the jury.284 The jury returned a verdict for the death
penalty.285
To support his post-conviction claim, Wiggins introduced testimony
of a social worker describing an elaborate social history presentation,
including evidence of the severe physical and sexual abuse Wiggins had
suffered at the hands of his mother and while in the care of a number of
foster homes.286 This report relied upon state social service records,
medical and school records, as well as interviews with Wiggins and
numerous family members.287 It revealed that Wiggins’ mother was an
alcoholic who would leave her children alone for days without food,
forcing them to beg, eat paint chips, or salvage food from garbage
cans.288 She beat the children for breaking into the kitchen, which she
kept locked, and had sex with men while her children slept in the same
bed.289 On one occasion, she forced Wiggins’ hand against a hot stove
burner which led to his hospitalization.290 At age six, Wiggins was
placed in foster care where he was physically abused by his foster
parents, and his second foster father repeatedly sexually molested him
and raped him.291 At age sixteen, he ran away from foster care and lived
on the streets; he returned to foster homes intermittently thereafter,
including one where the gang of his foster mother’s son raped him on
more than one occasion.292
Despite failing to raise these matters in mitigation, counsel did a
great deal of work in this case; however, representation was found to be
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
290
291
292

Id. at 515-16.
Id. at 516.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 516-17.
Id. at 516.
Id. at 516-17.
Id. at 517.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ineffective. Counsel represented Wiggins during a four-day trial before
the court.293 Counsel knew of Wiggins’ unfortunate childhood because
they had available to them the written presentence investigation report
prepared by the Maryland Division of Parole and Probation.294
Additionally, counsel “tracked down” records kept by the Baltimore City
Department of Social Services “documenting petitioner’s various
placements in the State’s foster care system.”295 Counsel also arranged
for a psychologist to conduct a number of tests on Wiggins, including an
IQ test, and, presumably, the Minnesota Multiphasic Inventory, but
“[t]hese reports revealed nothing, however, of [Wiggins’] life history.”296
Although these facts do not of themselves prove that the defendant’s
representation was effective, it does appear that Wiggins’ counsel did far
more than did Strickland’s. Indeed, in comparison to Tunkey’s lack of
investigation, Wiggins’ counsel seem diligent; thus, it is ironic that their
representation is found ineffective based on the standard set in
Strickland.
Similar results emerge in Rompilla v. Beard. Rompilla was found
guilty of murder and related offenses; the jury found three aggravating
factors that weighed in favor of assigning the death penalty.297
Rompilla’s evidence in mitigation presented at sentencing included
testimony from five family members who argued in favor of “residual
doubt, and beseeched the jury for mercy, saying that they believed
Rompilla was innocent and a good man.”298 Despite the two mitigating
factors that rehabilitation was possible and that his “son had testified on
his behalf,” the jury gave greater weight to the aggravating factors and
sentenced Rompilla to death.299
The district court in a later habeas proceeding found that the state
court had erroneously applied Strickland to counsel’s performance in the
293
294
295
296
297

Id. at 515.
Id. at 523.
Id.
Id.
Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2460. Specifically, the Court reasoned:
[D]uring the ensuing penalty phase, the prosecutor sought to prove
three aggravating factors to justify a death sentence: that the murder
was committed in the course of another felony; that the murder was
committed by torture; and that Rompilla had a significant history of
felony convictions indicating the use or threat of violence. . . . The
Commonwealth presented evidence on all three aggravators, and the
jury found all proven.

Id.
298
299

Id. at 2460.
Id. at 2461.
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penalty phase, finding that counsel had ignored “‘pretty obvious signs’
that Rompilla had a troubled childhood and suffered from mental illness
and alcoholism, and instead had relied unjustifiably on Rompilla’s own
description of an unexceptional background.”300 The circuit court
overturned the district court’s finding, pointing out counsel’s efforts to
discover evidence in mitigation, including:
interviewing Rompilla and certain family members, as
well as consultation with three mental health experts.
Although the majority noted that the lawyers did not
unearth the “useful information” to be found in
Rompilla’s “school, medical, police, and prison records,”
it thought the lawyers were justified in failing to hunt
through these records when their other efforts gave no
reason to believe the search would yield anything
helpful.301
The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit opinion on the
grounds that counsel’s representation failed to meet the standards set
forth in Strickland.302 The decision rests on a detailed fact description of
errors by trial counsel. Rather than focusing merely on what counsel did
or did not do, Justice Souter’s opinion stresses “a number of likely
avenues the trial lawyers could fruitfully have followed in building a
mitigation case.”303
Further, counsel should have considered
implications from known facts, such as extrapolating the defendant’s
long-standing drinking problem from the note in the police reports
indicating that he had been drinking at the time of the instant offense.304
The Court found dispositive that counsel failed to examine the court file
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted). Indeed, the Circuit court noted specifically that Rompilla did far
more than did Wiggins’ counsel. Id. Justice Souter observed:
The panel thus distinguished Rompilla’s case from Wiggins v.
Smith . . . Whereas Wiggins’s counsel failed to investigate adequately,
to the point even of ignoring the leads their limited enquiry yielded,
the Court of Appeals saw the Rompilla investigation as going far
enough to leave counsel with reason for thinking further efforts would
not be a wise use of the limited resources they had. But Judge
Sloviter’s dissent stressed that trial counsel’s failure to obtain relevant
records on Rompilla’s background was owing to the lawyers’
unreasonable reliance on family members and medical experts to tell
them what records might be useful.
Id.
302
Id. at 2467-69.
303
Id. at 2463.
304
Id.
300
301
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on Rompilla’s prior conviction, knowing that the prosecution would rely
on it in part to make its aggravation case.305 This duty stands in stark
contrast to Tunkey’s admission that he was not sure he looked at the
psychologist’s report filed in the case before Strickland was sentenced.306
Similarly, Tunkey apparently did no investigation save talking with the
defendant.307
VI. CONCLUSION
The first conclusion to emerge from the foregoing analysis is that
facts change the law. The Strickland line of cases underscores that, even
though the verbal formula used to describe the applicable rule does not
change, the legal standard changes. Evidence of this change is that the
scope of facts considered as relevant expands greatly in the later cases.
Indeed, matters once deemed by the Court as unimportant and
irrelevant are now the basis for finding that counsel’s representation
failed to meet constitutional requirements of effectiveness. Ricoeur’s
framework explains that judges exercise discretion in these cases by
changing the level of abstraction or scale used to describe the historical
events underlying the habeas proceeding. As judges progressively
increase the density of their descriptions, counsel is effectively held to a
standard more rigorous than would be required by a fair reading of the
original Strickland decision. The way the judges describe the relevant
facts has changed the law.
A more tentative conclusion also suggests itself. Insofar as Ricoeur
unsettles a too-easy reliance on the correspondence between historical
events and the facts as found in appellate decisions, his analysis likewise
unsettles assumptions made in legal scholarship that the drafting of facts
need not be interrogated so robustly as other components of case
holdings. Ricoeur’s work argues that the forging of legal categories may
be as much a matter of scaling and adjusting the density of facts as it is of
expanding or contracting proposed legal norms. If this assertion is true,
then scholars have here a tool for examining precedent whose reasoning
cannot be satisfactorily explained by recourse to the development of
norm-driven categories. Facts in appellate opinions are rarely pure and
never simple. The legal academy needs to look more closely at the
exercise of judicial discretion that characterizes any recounting of
historical events in court opinions. In so doing, we may profitably

305
306
307

Id. at 2463-64.
Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879, 888-89 (5th Cir. 1982).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 672-73 (1984).
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recognize that it is a fictional Detective Joe Friday who insists on one’s
ability to state “just the facts.”
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